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Abstract
This qualitative research aims to examine the nature and reasons for America support
for Arab authoritarian regimes in Egypt, Saudi Arabia and Yemen, and to provide further
details by examining the inferiority of liberal cultures and superiority of realist approach and
continuation/discontinuation of this existing approach after/during the Arab Spring by case
studies. In order to have a systematic analysis, alternative theoretical models, including a
revised national interest model, the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model
(Dueck ,2008),the international conditions analysis by Petras (2011),and US domestic politics
model will be examined. Currently, the issue under study suffers from little systematic
theoretical analysis, with no attempts to draw insights from theoretical models.
Research background and questions
The United States, as one of the liberal democracies, always seems to incorporatethe
democratic rhetoric into its foreign policymaking process (Pollack, 2009). For example, after
911 attacks, the ‘participation-moderation’ theory seemed to have appeared in the Bush
administration, saying that the cause of Islamic extremism was attributable to the lack of
political participation in authoritarian Arab regimes, and that in order to reduce threats to the
US and tackle the problem of terrorism, the US would attempt to promote democratization of
those regimes an important agenda, as shown by Bush’s intervention in Iraq 2003 (Dalacoura,
2010 & Schwedler, 2006:Bermeo, 1997).
However, throughout the years, US Middle East policies have also been characterized
by America’s support tofriendly authoritarian Arab regimes such as Mubarak in Egypt, Saudi
monarchy regime, and Saleh in Yemen by providing massive amount of military aid, arms
sales annually and various forms of political support (Byman et al., 2011:Yom, 2008). For
example, while US officials paid lip services to democracy and political reforms, US also
5

provided a sum of $13.3 billion to these regimes during 2002-2005 as well as aid and arm
package in 2007 (Yom, 2008;USAID, 2006). In addition, negative conditionality was rarely
used to demand reforms, meaning that there would not be withdrawal of economic aid and
military assistance in case of non-compliance, with the only recent exception being the
military aid to Egypt (Yom, 2008: Marcus, 2013: Martinez, 2013).It was until the very last
minute that America gave up the Mubarak regime in 2011 and Saleh regimein 2011/2012
mainly due to overriding changes in international conditions and certain US domestic politics
(Petras, 2011;Brownlee ,2012a).
There must be some compelling reasons for the US to pursue such contradictory
policies between democracy promotion and supports to friendly autocracies and the eventual
abandonment of Mubarak and Saleh regime.Currently, the vast majorityof literature articles
adopt the realist national interests approach to explain this issue. As argued by Dueck (2008),
America, in general, has a neoclassical realist grand strategy model of foreign policy with
both liberal culturesand realist elements, but realism always predominates due to many
reasonswhile liberalideologies only have secondary roles (Dueck ,2008). Strategic adjustment
(changes) occurs primarily due to changes in international conditions/pressure. It may be thus
possible that the analysis of grand strategy could be applied to this issue.Thus, the research
questions are to find out ,firstly, the nature of US foreign policy towards friendly Arab
regimes and reasons for US realist inclination in the case of chosen countries (Egypt, Saudi
Arabia, and Yemen, Bahrain); and secondly, if there are any critical conditions/factors
leading to the marginal rolesof US liberal strategic culturesin the shaping of US policy in the
Arab context andthirdly, the reasons for prolonged support to authoritarian regimes and the
eventual discontinuation of the support after/during the Arab Spring. The following
hypothesises are proposed.
Hypothesises
6

1. US foreign policy towards friendly Arabs authoritarian regimes are shaped by both
liberal strategic cultures and realism.
2. In US foreign policy towards friendly Arab autocracies, realist has triumphedliberal
strategic culturesfor a long time due to a number of factors. Liberal strategic cultures
playsminor roles and functions only under certain special circumstances.
3. There are certain mechanisms leading to continuation of existing US policies towards
friendly Arab autocrats after/during the Arab Spring, subject to different international
conditions/pressures/threats.
4. Pro-American Arab regimes could also be abandoned by the US unwillingly due to
overwhelming international/US domestic politics associated with the liberal strategic
cultures after/during the Arab Spring
Research significance
In the first place, aqualitative research makes contribution to the study ofMiddle East
and North Africa (MENA) democratization. Among MENA Arab regimes, the vast majority
of them are of strong neopatrimonial nature, one of which surviving mechanisms hinges on
rentierism, referring to the distribution of economic rents and other political benefits to
maintain the loyalty of important social constituencies, so as to consolidate the
neopatrimonial authoritarian rule (Hinnebusch, 2006: Dodge ,2012). However, petroleum is
not omnipresent in large quantities in every state, for example, Egypt and Yemen, and thus
the level of external supports become a very important source of rents to support the
patrimonial rule (Hinnebusch, 2006). In particular, as suggested by Bellin (2012),
international support could enhance the regimes’ ‘coercive capacity: thephysical wherewithal
to muster men and material necessary to repress’. Thus, a comprehensive understanding of
the role of external supports would enable us to develop insights into the obstacles to political
change in the mobilizing stage, the transition stage and the consolidating stage of Arab
7

democratization This understanding is especially important for the current Arabs uprising
against autocratic governments, which may lead to large-scale political and economic
instabilities ranging from riots to civil wars (Byman et al., 2011).
Secondly, the research on external supports to the regimes may also shed some light
on the understanding and prevention of Islamic terrorism, as the robustness of these proAmerican authoritarian regimes may breed terrorism in the long term (Byman et al., 2011). In
particular, there is a wide range of social, economic and political grievances within these
societies, and all these grievances may well lead to formations of anti-status-quo terrorists
groups, as a way to voice grievances and demand for higher living standards (Byman et al.,
2011). Most importantly, America’s soft power in Arab societies could be tarnishedby being
seen as supporters for dictators (Byman et al., 2011). Therefore, a thorough understanding of
US support for Arab authoritarian regimes may enable us to understand one of the most
important causes of Islamic terrorism.
Admittedly, there is no lack of articles dealing with these issues on the basis of
national-interest approach. However, there has been little systematic/comprehensive research
on the nature of US policy towards Arab autocrats with respect to some general
theories/models. There has also beenlittle research on the continuation or withdrawal of
American supports to authoritarian regimes after/during the Arab Spring. As suggested by
McGowan & Shapiro (1973), the absence of a general theory of foreign policy hinders the
systematic and consistent understanding of the relationships in foreign policy behaviour so
that one has to make uneducated guesses on foreign policy matters which are susceptible to
biases/ oversimplification. Furthermore, the existing national-interest approach is also
defective because of lack ofin-depth analysis of USnational interestsin MENA, examination
ofcurrent international threats and the opportunity costs of regime collapse.In addition,
theories on international and US domestic politics may also provide some insights into the
8

eventual cessation of supports to Mubarak and Saleh, all of which are largely absent in the
current research articles.This research would thus try to address the above concerns by the
use of some theoretical models.
Methodologies
This research is of qualitative nature and journal articles, books, internet information
and news articles would be major sources of information, implication and literature review,
all of which are readily accessible on the internet and in different university libraries, so as to
find out the reasons and nature of US foreign policy in the issue of supporting autocratic proAmerican regimes. As suggested by Ragin & Amoroso (2010), qualitative research mostly
focuses on the examination of ‘in-depth knowledge’ and ‘elaboration and refinement of
images and concepts’, and thus all these could be used to reinterpret the nature of this issue
and consolidate our knowledge of thenational-interest perspective and advance our
understanding to the reasons for continued/discontinued adoption of the existing approach.
As for comparative methods, they are not applicable here since the goal of this research is not
to ‘unravel the different causal conditions connected to different outcomes’ and in other
words, Comparison between the similarities and differences across a number of different case
studieswould be not be employed to ‘explain the diversity within a particular set of cases’
(Ragin &Amoroso, 2010). Moreover, this research would not be a quantitative one since on
one hand, it is very difficult to operationalize the independent variables (the reasons for
supporting pro-American dictatorships, the reasons for prolonged adoption of existing
policies) and the dependent variable (the phenomenon of US aids to Arab dictatorships)and
on the other hand, this research is not to ‘show the co-variation between two or more
variables across many cases’ (Ragin &Amoroso, 2010). Once again, the goals of this
research are to identify the nature and explain the reasons for such a peculiar US foreign
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policy ofprolonged supports to Arab dictatorships and the abandonment of some dictatorships
in the end and the case studies of the four Arab regimes are only for illustration purposes
The research questions and hypothesises would be investigated by a number of
theoretical frameworks. Instead of the purely national interest analysis approach, the use of
theoretical models enables us to understand the issue more systematically from a sound
theoretical base with wider range of perspective. Busha & Harter (1980) once argued that,
‘sound theoretical knowledge about the problem area from which the research task
originated is necessary to the conduct of meaningful inquiry, no matter what the subject of
the research would be’. In this research, the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by
(Dueck (2008) in addition to the revised national interest analysis would be used to examine
the nature and ideologies of supporting Arab dictatorships. In addition, the neoclassical realist
US grand strategy model by Dueck (2008), and the international conditions analysis by Petras
(2011), US domestic politics analysiswould be used to account for the prolonged continuity
of the existing approach of supporting Arab autocracies.
Furthermore, there are also cases studies. For example, in line with the following
reasons, four pro-American authoritarian regimes are chosen as case studies (Mubarak
Egyptian regime, Al-Saud Saudi regime, and Saleh Yemeni regime, Al-Khalifa Bahraini
regime). For example, they have to be pro-American Arab regimes, as manifested by the
massive annual US military and monetary support to the regimes, in particular of the security
apparatus and the US ensuing supports after/during the Arab Spring. Secondly, they have to
be of great national interests to America, be they political or economic. Thirdly, they all have
to be authoritarian regimes, with the classification of ‘not free’ from Freedom House reports
and indeed, all four regimes (Mubarak, Al-Saud, Al-Khalifa and Saleh) are all of the same
status.(Freedom House, 2013 & 2011).Fourthly, there should be some cases of successful
regime survival and regime collapse respectively to show the changes in US foreign policy in
10

the face of varying levels of international/US domestic politics and the presence/absence of
alternatives, since US supports is one of the most important factors of regime
breakdown/survival, as suggested by McKoy& Miller (2012).
Literature review and critical analysis
National-interest analysis
Currently, the vast majority of literature examines the issue with a national-interest
analysis, arguing that US practises realist policies towards supporting the autocratic regimes
because of their contribution to US regional interests .Since the national interest approach is
not just formed by one single article, the paragraphs below are the summarized contents of
some of the existing literature articles in the case of Mubarak Egypt, A;-Saud Saudi Arabia,
Al-Khalifa Bahrain and Saleh Yemen.
In the case of Egypt, the value of Egypt to Washington has gained salience ever since
the conclusion of Egypt-Israel peace treaty in 1979, making Egypt one of the two Arab
countries to have diplomatic relations with Israel and removing the possibility of another
Arab-Israel conflict, and the treaty also made Egypt a tool to fight against the USSR and the
Shiite Iran (Brownlee, 2012a). Furthermore, Egypt has also enabled the deployment of US
forces in the Persian Gulf by allowing the passage of Egyptian airspace and the use of
military facilities and installations such as the Cairo West Air Base and the Suez Canal for
refuelling and prepositioning purposes and Egypt also made contribution to counterterrorism
purposes by housing a large number of CIA personnel and providing intelligence support and
assistance in the ‘extraordinary rendition program’ against Islamic militants , so that US law
does not have to be followed (Brownlee, 2012a :Meet the Press, 2005). Thus, the Mubarak
regime was one of ‘the most US-aided autocracies’ after the cold war jumping from $1.5
billion to $2 billion aids from FY2005 to FY2007 and in FY2009, the delivery of small arms
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and ammunition to Egypt was worth $744,000 (Brownlee, 2012a:Arabawy, 2006: US Gov,
2006). After the ouster of Morsi, America continues to fund the Egyptian authorities for
counter-terrorism, military training and stressed that the halt in the delivery of military
equipment would not be permanent (Martinez, 2013).
For Saudi Arabia, one of the most important values to the US is the large amount of
oil reserve (Yom, 2008). Saudi Arabia is the second-largest oil producer, accounting for
around 11.3 % of US crude oil imports and 80% of the world’s reserve production and it also
became an important substitute to Libyan oil during the civil war (Rumsey, 2012: Ratner,
2011). Furthermore, the Sunni Saudi Arabia is important to counter the rise of Shiite Iranian
regime, which is an antagonist of America (Mabon, 2012). In particular, the Al-Saud regime
sought to do so by suppressing and isolating the Shiite Saudi Arabs in the eastern provinces
and by supporting the Sunni Al-Khalifa Bahraini monarchy against Shiite influence (Mabon,
2012). In addition, Saudi Arabia may also be regarded as a partner in counter-terrorism,
although it is alleged that the regime may have sponsored terrorism instead (Blanchard, 2010:
Prados & Blanchard, 2007). After the 911, the flow of funds have been subject to greater
control in Saudi Arabia and a ‘joint task force’ between the US and Saudi about terrorism
investigation has also been set up and Saudi NGOs associated with terrorism were also ban
(Blanchard, 2010). Thus, America, throughout the years, has had a large amount of arms
sales to Saudi Arabia, which is worth $17.9 billion from 1998 to 2005 (Prados & Blanchard,
2007).In 2006, the Bush administration also approved the 9 billion arms sales to Saudi Arabia,
including 24 Black Hawk Helicopters, 724 light armoured vehicles, 58 M1A1 Abrams tanks,
2300 long-range radio systems (Prados & Blanchard, 2007: Defense Security Cooperation
Agency, 2006).
Bahrain, albeit with Shiite majority, the Sunni monarchy could be mainly used as a
stronghold to contain the rise of the revisionist Shiite Iran in conjunction with Saudi
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cooperation, which is in America’s interests (Katzman, 2005). With its close proximity to
Iran, US military presence there could be used to deter Iran’s aggressive actions and ensure
regional stability (Katzman, 2005).In particular, Bahrain houses the US Navy headquarter of
the Fifth fleet in a 500-acres base with 5000 US naval personnel, some minesweepers, a
Carrier Battle Group, an Amphibious Assault Group, which could ‘interdict movement of
terrorists, arms or WMD-related technology’ (Katzman, 2005).Thus, Bahrain has long been
receiving US together with GCC military aids and arms sales such as the sales of nine
Blackhawk helicopters in 2007 ($252 million) and the sale of 30 Army Tactical missile
Systems in 2000, so as to keep the safe passage through Strait of Homuz and keep Iran’s
influence checked, given the majority Shiite population and became a ‘major non-NATO ally’
after the 911(Kahl &Lynch, 2013).
For Yemen, it is also a partner for counter-terrorism in the regions of Red Sea and
Arabian Peninsula (Prados & Sharp, 2007). With its relatively undeveloped economy,
ineffective law enforcement and tribal divisions, Yemen has long been plagued by terrorism,
especially in an eastern Yemeni province where it is the ‘ancestral homeland of Osama bin
Laden’ with many sympathizers for al-Qaeda (Prados& Sharp, 2007). Although Yemen was
accused of lack of cooperation after the USS Cole bombing, ever since the 911 attack, the
Yemeni President Saleh had been cooperating with America in the fight against the Al-Qaeda
and US special forces and CIA agents were permitted to operate on Yemeni soil to identify
and eliminate the large-size Al-Qaeda segments in Yemen and in particular, a missile strike
planned by America was carried out against an automobile carrying suspected terrorists in
Yemen, killing the planner of the USS Cole bombing (Prados & Sharp, 2007: Sharp, 2010).
America thus has also been providing an increasing amount of economic and military aids to
Yemen, jumping from an average of 25 million in 2007 to 52.5 million in 2010 during the
Obama administration (Prados & Sharp, 2007: Sharp, 2010).
13

National-Interest analysis: Asset mobility approach
Lastly, the asset mobility model by Brownlee (2012a) may also shed some lights of
the US policy after/during the Arab Spring. This concerns the political economy analysis of
the prospect for US bolstered regime change (Bellin, 2004: Brownlee, 2002 & 2012a: Snyder,
1992). In essence, it is argued that the possession of ‘immobile assets’ would be make elite
‘fear of expropriation’ (Boix, 2003). In particular, if US interests associated with particular
friendly regimes/ rulers are ‘fixed and immobile’ and if there are foreseeable anti-American
extremists takeover after the collapse of authoritarian regime, ‘the redistributive pressure’
from anti-American forces in those countries would be very high and Washington would be
very unwilling to give up the regimes for fear of US assets tied to those autocracies such as
‘intelligence support, military cooperation , diplomatic collaboration’ being expropriated by
anti-American popular regimes in the transition period (Brownlee, 2012a).
National-Interest Analysis: International conditions analysis
As suggested by Petras (2011), whether US would withdraw or continue to support
authoritarian regimes after/during the Arab Spring depends on factors such as the regime
capability to cope with domestic unrests, the military loyalty to the regime, and ‘the
availability of a pliable replacement’. If all these factors turn to be unfavourable to the
regime survival and better alternatives exist, US would not to ‘stick with’ the authoritarian
regimes for fear of radicalizing the opposition and generating anti-Americanism, leading to
revolutions and civil wars (Petras, 2011). Examples of miscalculations include the 1959
Cuban Revolution, when America firmly supported the authoritarian Batista regime and
failed ‘to present a viable pro-US alternative coalition’; and the case of Nicaraguan Somoza
regime supported by President Carter, leading to strong anti-American forces deposing the
pro-American dictator and expropriating US assets (Petras ,2011).

14

The Foreign policy model: US Grand strategy
In the past, grand strategy refers to ‘a calculated relationship of ends and means, in
the face of one or more potential opponents’ or even ‘with the possibility of use of force
internationally’ (Luttwak , 2001 as cited in Dueck, 2008). As a branch of foreign policy,
there is a high degree of overlaps between foreign policy and grand strategy, so theories of
grand strategy may shed some light on the foreign policy behaviours (Dueck, 2008). In
addition to win wars, grand strategy includes other pursuits such as non-military goals and
objectives of political, economic or ideological nature during peacetime and wartime (Dueck,
2008). To put it into details, things such as national interests/goals, threats to national
interests, national resources and ways used to counter these threats would be identified and
prioritized and as a ‘conceptual road map’, grand strategy also identifies resources to
promote national interests and gives ‘a set of policy prescriptions’(Art, 1991: Dueck,
2008).Even though grand strategy may not be designed or followed all the time, governments
‘act as if they do’ because offrequent trade-offs among defence spending, alliance diplomacy
and military intervention and contradiction between ends and means, so ‘strategic
decisions’should always be made to balance military and political means and ends amidst the
chance of armed conflict (Dueck, 2008). Thus, grand strategy exists always (Dueck, 2008).
The US grand strategy is never in a static mode and there are ‘strategic adjustments’
(changes), defined by the significant expansion, contraction of overall strategic capabilities
and commitments (Trubowitz et al, 1999). A suggested by Dueck (2008), it could be
manifested by the changes in factors such as alliance commitments, size of military
deployments, changes in foreign aids, the engagement and/or disengagements from
diplomatic activities, with possible variations in these categories at times and in particular, a
‘first-order change’ occurs when there is significant change in strategic commitments,
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followed by less fundamental ‘second-order change’ and some ‘minor tinkering’ which
always occur in most of the cases.
As suggested by Dueck (2008), the decision-making processes for the US grand
strategy/foreign policy are subject to influences of BOTH elements of power (realism) and
liberal strategic cultures. Both are considered for the explanation of strategic adjustment
(Dueck, 2008). For the realist thinking, it emphasize the crucial role of international condition
and argues that all states act similarly to , most importantly, maximize their relative gains in
national interests in terms of political, military and economic powers to survive and seek to
minimize potential threats in the zero-sum game anarchic international system filled with
perpetual violence, uncertainties (Dueck, 2008).Liberal ideals (democratic peace, economic
interdependence, institutions) are practically unfeasible because of the anarchic situation
(Dueck, 2008).States would often cheat and break institutional rules/international laws/norms
to have more relative gains under the Hobbesian anarchic condition (Dueck,
2008).Democracy and capitalist economic development may not necessarily moderate
extremists’ behavioursand produce peaceful foreign policy outcomes in the face of high
threats to security interests and high uncertainties and fears (Doyle, 1997:Gilpin, 1986:
Dueck, 2008). For the liberal strategic culture, America is always characterized by its strong
rhetoric inliberal ideals, democratic-peace theory, and economic interdependence theory
(Dueck, 2008). It says that democracy and neoliberal capitalism would bring peace by
pacifying the zero-sum game of interest pursuit by using institutional rule, international law,
and increasingly economic interconnectedness across borders (Dueck, 2008). Civil political
participation would also lead to moderation of radical politics (Dueck, 2008).The absence of
democracy and capitalism would lead to instabilities/conflicts and poverty (Dueck,
2008).Most importantly, capitalistic development, democracy and peace would also mutually
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reinforce each other, as illustrated by the Kantian peace triangle, all of which are in
America’s interests (Doyle, 1997:Dueck, 2008:Mingst & Arreguín-Toft, 2010).
A understanding of US strategic adjustment lies in the neoclassical realism school
(Dueck, 2008). While it argues that realism is still the ‘single most important’ determining
factor in strategic adjustment of grand strategy, it also includes US liberal strategic cultures
elements (Dueck, 2008). The reasons for the predominance of realist thoughts over liberal
political cultures are that in spite of liberal cultures’ merits in explaining occasional foreign
policy behaviour deviations from realist thinking, there are several limitations of liberal
cultures to be the dominant explanatory factor: firstly, US liberal strategic cultures are always
unchangeable and fixed, and thus the changes in policies and commitment of grand strategy
cannot be explained by very powerfully by American political cultures ,and secondly,
theliberal approach doubts the values of military actions, security-seeking behaviour, all of
which are not compatible with the current international conditions (Dueck, 2008). On the
contrary, given the lack of effective global governance mechanism, America is pretty much
left with an anarchic, highly uncertain situation and has no choice but to put national interests
at the top of US foreign policy agenda for survival and dominance while international
interests and liberal ideals are secondary interests (Dueck, 2008).Thus, realist theory is the
principal reflection of state foreign policy behaviour (Dueck, 2008). Most importantly,
realism may even further gain salience in the grand strategy in the case of highly threatening
international conditions with very high external threats, since national interests are at stake
and there are urgent needs to fight and keep national interests intact for survival and the
strategies needed are of high realist nature (Dueck, 2008).
In particular, in line with the classical realist thinking, neoclassical realism believes
that strategic adjustments(changes)in grand strategy/foreign policy occur primarily due to
significant external threats to the existing approach/national interests and/or overriding
17

changes in the international conditions/pressures(Dueck, 2008). The higher the external
threat/state capabilities, the more realist policies the state would adopt and vice versa for the
reverse (Doyle, 1997:Gilpin, 1986: Christensen, 1996:Dueck, 2008). However, neoclassical
realists are also sensitive to US domestic-level factors of political cultural tradition, which
could affect the policy outcomes (Dueck, 2008). Liberal cultures could fulfil the filtering role
by further delimiting the range of possible policy options amidst occasional indeterminacy in
international conditions since policymakers have to select policy options that fit the liberal
strategic cultures, at least on paper, to gain US domestic supports (Dueck, 2008).
Policymakers themselves may actually been socialized to match the America’s liberal
political cultures (Sterling–Folker ,1997:Dueck, 2008: Kupchan, 1994).
US Domestic politics analysis
As a liberal democracy, US foreign policy is also affected by many US domestic
politicssuch as pressures from the Congress/senior security advisors, lobbying activities, and
mass media, which serve as the intervening variables to constraint the US foreign
policy’srealist, national interest-based decision-making during foreign policy crisis (Jentleson,
2010:Devlen & Ozdamar, 2009).
Congressional/senior security advisors’ unity in opinions
In the case of senior security advisors’ pressure, it is important in the sense that US
presidents are used to having a strong reliance on senior foreign policy advisers such as the
national security advisers, the secretary of state, and the secretary of defense (Jentleson,
2010). As for congressional pressure, the US Congress, in particular the Senate iscrucial
because it is responsible for foreign policy oversight, budget, ratification of treaties, and
declaration of war (Jentleson, 2010). As suggested by Jentleson (1990), the effects
ofpressures on the eventual foreign policy decisions during crisis would be greatest in the
18

case of unity among congressional/senior security advisors. This can change the president’s
belief and a particular foreign policy issue and thereby the final policy outcome (Jentleson,
1990). The effects of congressional/senior security advisors pressure would be weakest in the
absence of unity among congressional opposition (Jentleson, 1990). For example, in the case
of US supports to the Shah of Iran during the 1979 Revolution, the ‘dissenting disunity’
among ‘senior foreign policy advisors’ (between the National Security Advisor and the
Secretary of State) failed to change Carter’s mind to abandon the Shah in the wake of the
revolution (Jentleson, 1990).As for the case of the Philippines, President Regan withdrew
supports to Marcos eventually because of the assassination of Aquino (Jentleson, 1990).
There had been a great dissent among the US Ambassador to the Philippines, the Secretary of
State Shultz, the Joint Chief of Staff Admiral Crowe, and the Assistant Secretary of Defense
(Jentleson, 1990). There had even been a dissent in between the Democrat congressional
leader and Republican congressional leader, and in particular, many Democrats (Jentleson,
1990). For example, Rep Stephen Solarz, Chairman of the House Foreign affairs
subcommittee on Asia and the Pacific, proposed ‘deep cuts’ in military aids to Marcos
government in 1984 and 1985 and many Republicans such as ‘Senator Richard Lugar,
chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and Dave Durenberger, chairman of
the Senate Intelligence Committee, were also ‘‘highly critical of Marcos’’’ and there was a
bipartisan action to condemn the corrupted Filipino election on February 7 as well as the
Solarz subcommittee’s decision to cut military aid to Marcos with an unanimous vote in the
House (Jentleson, 1990).
The strength of lobbying activities
As for lobbying activities, they are defined as ‘a group of persons who work or
conduct a campaign to influence members of a legislature to vote according to the group's
special interest’ (Dictionary.com, 2009). In the foreign policy context, there are two types of
19

lobby groups. The first type is ethnic lobby groups which are formed by Americans of similar
ethnic and religious identity to their interests in America andto fight for the benefits of their
ancestral homeland (Jentleson, 2010). The second type is foreign lobbying groups which are
groups of foreign governments-paid American public relations firms, law firms, senators,
congressmen, and lobbyists to lobby for their interests by influencing legislators/US foreign
policies to favour the foreign governments (Jentleson, 2010). The criteria of success include
contributing campaign finances, their organization structure, the ease of access to foreign
policy-makers, ability to guarantee of lawmakers’ employment (for example: whether the
lobbyists could mobilize voters to vote for congressmen/senators favourable to them) (Gregg,
2002: Dekker, 2010: Smith, 2000).
Mass media and American public opinion during foreign policy crisis
As for the effects of mass media and U.S. public opinion on foreign policies crisis,
they work in a two-way street, that is, they could compel the foreign policy-makers to revise
decisions by negative images/reports or by generating dissenting American public (Naveh,
2002).
For the media effects on foreign policy, mass media often report‘new and surprising,
important, violent and negative’during a foreign policy crisis (Naveh, 2002: Hastedt,
2006).There is thereforea prevalence of negative, violent, emotional images and news reports
that generate the so-called CNN effect, which forces policymakers to revise the existing
foreign policies in response to ‘the perceived reality constructed by the press’ and the
resulting US public opinion (Naveh, 2002: Hastedt, 2006). In particular, the media exerts its
influence firstly through agenda setting and priming, which diverts the attention of the
policymakers and public to the media-focused foreign policy issues (Naveh, 2002).With more
information associated with particular issues due to agenda-setting, people’s judgement of the
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success or failures of their leader’s management of the issues could also be shaped (priming)
(Naveh, 2002: Hastedt, 2006:Scheufele & Tewksbury, 2007). In addition, framing is also an
issue here by which the media reports provide an interpretive frame guiding the public and
policymakers to think and value the issues (Naveh, 2002). The mass media also generates
forceful public opinion pressure on the media-focused issuesand public opinion forces the
leaders to confront the issues and to be accountable to the public opinion in a liberal
democracy (Naveh, 2002: Hastedt, 2006: Baum & Potter, 2008).
However, with a clear government’s media management (MM) policies formed by PR
professionals, the effect of media coverage on foreign policy changes may be limited by the
government’s spin such as government-initiated coverage, censorship, restrictions on media’s
movement or their access to information and data, so as to build ‘positive-supportive
coverage and cover political activities’ and the mass media would tend to be in line with the
administration’s agenda setting and framing and even incorporated the official positions as
the basis of their media reports, known as the ‘indexing hypothesis’ (Naveh, 2002:Smith &
Hadfield & Dunne, 2008). Thus, the US mass media could only exert effects on US foreign
policy in the absence of a clear government’s media management policies directing ‘a clear
frame of reference’ to the media and the US media would report foreign policy events ‘from
the human side’(Hastedt, 2006)..
Critical analysis of the realist national-interest framework and the US grand strategy
neoclassical realist model, asset mobility approach, international conditions analysis and US
Domestic politics analysis
Clearly, the vast majority of literature adopts a national interest analysis to show the
reasons for US to support autocracies. They use the realist framework, which emphasizes that
states, in an anarchic international system, pursue the maximization of states’ self-interests to
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respond to the constraints upon them (Mingst &Arreguín-Toft, 2010: Rumsey, 2012). To sum
up, it is said that US has adopted realist policies because of the overriding importance of
national interests (Yom, 2008).
However, there are several areas for improvement. Firstly, the above national interest
analysis is only a series of descriptions/examples of the mutual contributions between these
Arab autocracies and US such as the US military and political aids and regimes’ efforts in
things like counterterrorism, balance of power, oil supply. An additional integration of
knowledge is needed to understand the US national interest in the region, the nature,
continuation/discontinuation of US foreign policy in MENA, in-depth examination of US
national interests in MENA, and the expected negative consequences of authoritarian regime
collapse are either not clearly pointed out nor sufficiently examined in the national interest
analysis of existing literature. It is inadequate to develop a complete understanding of the real
policy rationale without a clear clarification of the nature of US foreign policy in MENA,
delineation of US national interests in the Arab world, and the corresponding international
threats in MENA before analysing the significance and values of each of these regimes to
America.
Furthermore, there is no systematic account for why America during the Bush
administration initiated a series of democracy promotion programs such as Middle East
Partnerships Initiative (MEPI) and the Broader Middle East and North Africa Initiative
(BMENA) if America really pursues a purely realist approach in the Arab world. Most
importantly, the national-interests analysis is not examined against US grand strategy so that
the nature of US foreign policy and the reasons for realist primacy over liberalism are unclear.
Furthermore, the reasons for such consistent supports to/ eventual abandonment of most Arab
autocracies over time are not examined, apart from the sole analysis of overriding national
interests. Let us examine the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model.
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The implications drawn from the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model and the
US domestic politics analysis could provide a good general frameworkto examine the
research objectives and questions and hypothesises. For examples, it can be used to outline
the importance of international conditions and US domestic politics responsible for the
continuation/discontinuation of US foreign policytowards friendly Arab autocracies in the
wake of Arab Spring and how to measure if there is a change (strategic adjustment)
(Dueck ,2008). However, this neoclassical realist model of foreign policy does not give
details as to the what exact changes in the international conditions/threats and what exact US
domestic liberal political elements would affect the US decision to abandon or continue to
supports friendly Arab regime in the wake of revolutions in 2011. Instead, the international
conditions analysis by Petras (2011) mentioned factors such as regime capability to cope with
protests, military loyalty, and the existence of possible alternatives as reasons affecting US
foreign policy decisions. However, the international conditions analysis by Petras (2011) is
defective for the following reasons. Firstly, there is no any analysis of the factors pointed out
by Petras (2011). Secondly, it ignores the role of US domestic liberal politics as intervening
variables, as pointed out by the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by Dueck (2008).
For the asset mobility model by Brownlee (2012a), although it is similar to the
international conditions analysis by Petras (2011), it further gives an analysis of the reason
why US would keep certain the Arab autocracies for so long with reference to the concepts of
‘asset mobility’ and ‘redistributive pressure’in the wake of the Arab Spring in 2011.
However, this model is currently confined to the cases of Ben Ali Tunisian regime and
Mubarak Egyptian regime, and most importantly, even though the concepts of ‘asset mobility’
and ‘redistributive pressure’ sound logical, the results of asset mobility analysis are flawed
since it was reported that US did abandon Mubarak in Egypt and Saleh in Yemen, though in
an unwilling way and it could only explain the prolonged unwillingness of US to give up the
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regimes but fails to explain why US would eventually abandon them (Guzansky & Striem,
2013). This research would thus propose to investigate whether there are any viable
alternativeleaders to the existing rules but not about the alternatives to existing regimes per se.
Chapter II: the proposed structure, the nature, reasons of US foreign policy of realist
favouritism and the inferiority of liberal approach in the Arab context with case studies
Proposed structure
Given all the pros and cons of the above approaches, no single approach could
dominate in the analysis of US foreign policy in this issue. Instead, this research proposes a
new integrated approach with elements of both revised national interest analysis, the grand
strategy approach, the asset mobility approach, the international condition analysis, and the
US domestic politics analysis. In the 1st part of the research analysis, the research begins with
the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by Dueck (2008) to examine the nature of
US foreign policy towards the Arab world that is characterized by both liberal and realist
approaches. It would also examine the secondary role of liberal culture approach and the
primacy of the realist approach. It would be followed by a revised national interest analysis to
understand the US national interests in MENA and the basic rationales of US favouritism
towards autocracies, the current international threats to US interests in MENA, and the
opportunity costs of US favouritism towardsfriendly Arab autocracies.
In the 2nd part of the research analysis, with reference to the concept of ‘strategic
adjustment’ (changes) in foreign policies by Dueck (2008) , there will be an examination of
the degree of changes in US foreign policy towards the four case studies after the Arab
uprisings in 2011. Furthermore, the international conditions analysis by Petras (2011) ,
together with the elements from the asset mobility analysis by Brownlee (2012a) and in the
US domestic politics analysis, would altogether explain the continuity/discontinuity of
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existing US policies after/during the Arab Spring 2011 in the case of the four selected case
studies (Mubarak Egypt, Saleh Yemen, Al-Saud Saudi Arabia, Al-Khalifa Bahrain).
The existence of US foreign policy grand strategy in the Arab context
As mentioned above,US grand strategy would exist when there are trade-offs among
different means and ends in the face of potential armed conflicts and in the neoclassical
realist sense, there are both realist and liberal strategic cultural elements in the general US
grand strategyand every foreign policymaking decisions must fit in to both elements, but
realism always predominates over liberalism because of the anarchic international system,
high international threats and the fixed nature of US liberal cultures (Dueck, 2008).
In the case of the Arab world, a neoclassical realist US grand strategy with both
elements of realism and liberal cultures therefore probably exists on the grounds that there are
always exceedingly high potential armed conflicts such as the issue of Islamic
terrorism/counterterrorism, Palestine-Israel conflicts, and sectarian armed conflicts between
Shiite and Sunni (like the mutual hostilities between Saudi Arabia and Iran) as well as great
power rivalries, all of which threaten US national interests in MENA to a very high extent
and it is understandable that US is thus forced to strike a right balance between different aims
and objectives from time to time. For example, America was forced to abandon the Mubarak
regime during the Jasmine Revolution because of the Egyptian military and America
sometimes also has to restrain Israeli actions a bit for fear of the widespread Arab discontents
such as the fact that during the 1st Gulf War, US had to persuade Israel intensively not to
retaliate in case of Iraq’s missile attacks (Petras , 2011: Hadar, 2006, Mearsheimer& Walt,
2007:Stephens, 2006). All these have led to the adoption of grand strategy as a general
framework to US foreign policymaking in MENA and the Arab world.
Presence of liberal approach
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With reference to the neoclassicalrealist US grand strategy model explained by Dueck
(2008), it is logical to deduce that the US grand strategy in MENAis likely to conform to the
national liberal strategic culturesto a certain extent andthe moderating effects of the
democratic peace theory and economic development and the Kantian peace triangle would
thus probably be the focuses. The grand strategy model by Dueck (2008) would imply that ,in
the Arab context, the liberal elements in the US foreign policy would point tothe strong
authoritarian nature asthe cause of a series of problems like poverty,Islamic terrorism and
anti-Americanism as well as widespread regional stabilities such as sectarian conflicts and
great power rivalry. Instead, the rule of law, institutional rules, political legitimacy and
accountability associated with democracy would transform the zero-sum game interest
pursuits to a positive-sum game among Sunnis , Shiites , US , Russia and the opportunities
since political participation would also moderate Islamic militant groups, giving rise to
peaceful Islamic regimes, and the extensive trade within the MENA region would also
increasethe incentive for peace.To sum up, with the mutually reinforcing notion of the
Kantian peace triangle, liberal elements would probably play a role, albeit to a lesser extent,in
the US foreign policy towards MENAaiming to resolve these long-standing conflicts by
means ofthe rhetoric ofUS democracy promotionespecially during the junior Bush
administration and the long-standing,development aids offered to pro-American Arab
authoritarian regimes for social and economic development, albeit also in a sense of aiding
autocracies.
For example, after the 911, in December 2002, the Secretary of State Colin Powell
during the Bush administration announced the development program named ‘Middle East
Partnership Initiatives’ (MEPI) with a total sum of $565 million (US Department of State,
2002). With reference to deficits in political freedom, women’s empowerment and
knowledge outlined by the UN Development Program (UNDP) Arab Human Development
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report in 2002, the Bush administration constructed four pillars of the MEPI project
(economic, political, educational and women rights with a lots of ‘regional-wide and countryspecific projects’and another program has also been set up called ‘Broader Middle East and
North Africa’ (BMENA) Partnership Initiative , which is something about democracy
promotion and socio-political reforms initiatives facilitated mainly the US government (US
Department of State, 2002: UNDP, 2002:Dalacoura, 2005: Wittes & Yerkes, 2006: Yom ,
2008). Since 1960, economic and military aids amounting to $60 billion have been sent to
Egypt and $1.3 million was allocated for democratic governance (DG) assistance in Bahrain
from 1990 to 2004 , and $334.3 million in 14 years for Egypt, $0.4 million in 1 year for Saudi
Arabia, $6.6 million in 8 years for Yemen (Pérez-Liñán & Seligson& Tate, 2008:USAID,
2006: Yom , 2008).In addition, President Obama also made a speech in Cairo in 2009, saying
that ‘no system of government can or should be imposed upon one nation by any other and
governments that reflect the will of the people’(NYTimes.com, 2009).Neoconservatives such
as President Bush also invaded and occupied Iraq in the name of overthrowing the Saddam
dictator and promoting democratic nation-building, in the hope of spreading regional-wide
stability as a result of democratization (Dalacoura, 2005: NYTimes.com, 2009: Dodge, 2009).
Realist primacy and liberal inferiority and reasons
However, liberal strategic cultures, albeit with certain roles in the grand strategy, are
always of less importance than realist approaches as illustrated by the neoclassical realist US
grand strategy model by Dueck (2008) which is also applicable to the context of US foreign
policy towards the Arab world. While US did promote democracy in MENA, there are a
number of shortcomings of these aids and programs, not to mention the possibility of the use
of democracy promotion rhetoric to gain domestic US supports, US unwavering supports to
those friendly regimes throughout the years such as arms sales and military aids as mentioned
in the introduction and the literature review, making these democracy promotion efforts
27

insincere and the primacy of realism over liberal cultures. Thus, when realist goals compete
with liberal ideals, the former always gains salience over the latter.
Firstly, MEPI and BMENA are much or less the same thing as other ongoing
projectsby the United States Agency for International Development (USAID), which has
posed no ‘major impetus for reform’ throughout the years(Durac &Cavatorta ,
2009:Dalacoura, 2005). Secondly, there is a serious lack of funding in BMENA and MEPI, of
which initial funding was merely $29 million, and in four fiscal years time, the total funding
was only $293 million, standing in stark contrastto other military aids to Arab autocracies
accounting for billions and billions dollars and the fundingworth $293 million within 4 FYs
had to even be shared between MEPI and BMENA, making the money available a very small
amount (Durac & Cavatorta , 2009:Dalacoura, 2005). Most importantly,70% of funding were
associated with programs improving the Arab government machineries and officials, while
Arab NGOs only received 15% of them, leading to only ‘controlled liberalization’ (Durac &
Cavatorta , 2009:Dalacoura, 2005: US Department of State, 2005). In addition, US only
abandoned the Mubarak and Saleh regime until the very last moment in the name of stability
and ‘orderly transition’andthe US-Tunisia relations during the Ben Ali era was more about
military-intelligence cooperation than democratization with little influence from the MEPI,
showing that America is not every sincere about full-fledged democratization in the Arab
world (Durac & Cavatorta , 2009:US Department of State, 2013:Petras, 2011).
As deduced from the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by Dueck (2008),
the reasons behind this scenario in the Arab World context could be due to the highly
anarchic/threatening international conditions in MENA, making each US national interest
domain in MENA under great threats (illustrated by the revised national interest analysis), the
incompatibility between the fixed nature of US liberal cultures and the dynamics in the
MENA threatening situations.
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The highly anarchic, threatening Hobbesian international conditions in MENA
Contrary to the neoliberal institutionalism, the Arab world is best characterized by the
extreme Hobbesian anarchic nature compared to other regions in the world with virtually no
any presence of effective multilateral institutions nor any effective governance by
international law. Because of little intra-regional trade and the absence of any viable
democratic regimes, there are little pacifying effects. Instead, there is even an array of
illiberal Islamic groups in Arab autocracies, if not all, which are able to cause massive
regional-wide instabilities, posing morerisks to the US national interests than any other
regions in the world.It is thus conceivable that America pursues a largely realist strategy of
aiding Arab autocracies to gain benefits.
In terms of the lack of effective institutional rules, the Arab League is largely
ineffective in the case of conflict resolutions (Gartner, 2011:Pinfari, 2009). As mentioned by
Khasawneh (2008), ‘the history of the last six decades since the founding of the league in
1945 is deluged with examples of the Arab league’s inefficiency and incapacity to resolve any
of the major issues facing the region’. The mediation efforts by the Arab league in the
Palestinians and Jordanians are often marredby the ‘Black September’ incident and the
repeated failures of the September 1970,1976 Arab-Israeli ceasefire, the October agreement
(Gartner, 2011: Raab, 2008). Thus, no any guarantee can be made that America’s pursuit of
political, economic and military interests would be protected and each antagonistic competing
power in MENA is highly unlikely to achieve a positive-sum game in the end ,not to mention
the virtual absence of enforcement power of international law in this region and each player
(Russia or even China, undemocratic Shiite and Sunni regional powers, especially Islamists
groups who do not usually abide by the liberal international order), in practical, is free to
cheat so as to have more relative gains than others and seek to challenge the US hegemonic
position. For example, Russia and China objected to the UN Security Council’s resolution to
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further escalate pressures against the Assad regime after the chemical attack in 2013 (Malkin,
2013) .
In terms of the lack of pacifying effects from economic interdependence, firstly, the
benefits of economic interdependence may not be enough to offset the incentives to pursue
actual political and military power, as manifested by the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
Syria’soccupation of Lebanon, Arab-Iran hostilities. All these imply that economic relations
may not bring peace in line with the liberal thoughts. Secondly and most importantly, there
has not been extensive intraregional trade. For example, the Arab(GCC countries)-Iran trade
has remained very small throughout the years since there are deep-rooted hostilities between
Saudi Arabia and Iran, and similaroil-export economic structures between GCC countries and
Iran ,both tend to import non-oil products from developed countries (Habibi, 2010). Trade
among Arab countries has beenvery low, albeit with slight increase in 2000 and 2005,
constituting only 10% and being ‘only marginally higher than that in 1960’(Malik &
Awadallah, 2013). In the case of Maghreb-Gulf-Levantine intra-Arab trade and the proposed
regional free-trade area such Arab Maghreb Union, the Greater Free Trade Agreement, they
do not really bare fruits (Malik & Awadallah, 2013). Therefore, the low level of economic
interdependence among Arabs and between Arabs and Iran may also decrease the incentives
for peace and cooperation since if they attack each other, it could even serve the interests of
the victorious sides.
For the lack of pacifying effects from democracies, there are very few consolidated
liberal MENA democracies, with the exception of Israel (free) and Tunisia(partly free) while
almost all other Arab regimes experienced significant Arab Spring protests, including Egypt,
Saudi Arabia, Yemen and Bahrain, are classified as ‘not-free’(Freedom House, 2013 &
2011).Furthermore, illiberal regime is also an issue sincealthough popularly elected, these
newly-elected regimes, because of their status in the transition stage, would be similar to
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populist regimes being highly radical and anti-American/Israel and hence, should America
give way to democratization in the cases of friendly Arab autocracies, chances are that those
democracies may open door to Islamic extremism while the lofty goals of democratic-peace
theory ,participation-moderation thesis, economic interdependence theory would fail to bear
fruit, ending up with perpetual violence and instabilities with anti-American religious radicals
would rising to power through popular elections and all these would threaten US national
interests illustrated the Hamas takeover of Gaza in 2006 presidential election, whenthe
popularly-elected Hamas administration launched missile attacks against Israel and Fatah to
create a Taliban-like state with strict Sharia law, restricting civil liberties and women’s
rights(Freemuse.org , 2006: Byman et al., 2011).
Furthermore, because of the highly anarchic situation in MENA, there are neither any
international institutions nor international law able to stop the Israel-Hamas armed conflicts,
except with the peace-broker efforts by the Mubarak regime. Hence, once again, it shed some
lights on the value of keeping friendly Arab autocracies. It explains why America tends to
proactively/forcefully protect its interests by the realist use of friendly Arab autocracies and
liberal approaches, in turn, become a less important issue.
With insights drawing from the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by
Dueck (2008), it is fair to deduce that under such fearful and uncertain circumstances,
America, albeit a pride champion of American exceptionalism and liberal democracy, has no
reasons to pursue liberal ideals before safeguarding its survival.Instead, America is likely to
defensively or even offensively pursuesthe realist zero-sum rational game of relative gains in
powers (military, political and economic national interests)to satisfy the overwhelming
security concerns and cooperation is thus almost impossible.
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The liberal opposition to the use of forceful tactics also makes it in conflict with the
MENA international conditions. As suggested by Dueck (2008), the liberal tradition strongly
doubts the effectiveness, values of national security policies, grand strategy. Most
importantly, liberal cultures strongly oppose the use of realist elements such as ‘secret
diplomacy, standing armies, security precaution, intelligence services, and covert operations,
balance of power, military alliance’ in foreign policy. However, all these realist forceful
elements are strongly required in the ultra-anarchic conditions in MENA, in order to advance
interests and to effectively guard America against external dangers resulting from perpetual
uncertainties/conflicts in the region. For examples, it is an absurd fancy, without the realist
means of aiding autocracies, to achieve the following goals such as counterterrorism,
protecting Israel, ensuring stable supply of oil, countering Iran’s influence as illustrated in the
revised national interest analysis section.
The incompatibility between the fixed nature of US liberal cultures and the fast-changing
dynamic situation in MENA
US liberal cultures, because of its fixed nature, are quite incompatible with the
dynamic challenges posed by different Arab regimes. As suggested in the US grand strategy
model by Dueck (2008), due to its historical background as the first democracy in the world,
American political system is enshrined with long-standing liberal political cultures such asa
checks and balance system, the separation of power, Thus, liberal agendas such as democracy
promotion are also so deep-rooted in American foreign policy without any possibilities of
adaptive changes, limiting the role and explanatory power of liberal cultures in the US grand
strategy of foreign policy (Dueck, 2008).
The same token is applicable to the case of US foreign policy towards friendly Arab
authoritarian regimes. Different approaches/certain variations in grand strategy should be
used to deal with the issue effectively since the political dynamics associated with different
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regimes are different and are subject to the fast-changing dynamics of different
issues/causes/actors in MENA such as Sunni-Shiite sectarian conflict, Islamic terrorism, great
power rivalries, conflicts related to authoritarianism, poor governance and living standards
(civil wars, Arab Spring), or even the prolonged Israel-Palestinian conflict, all of which could
suddenly emerge onto the surface at different time/different places such as the sudden selfimmolation of Tunisian vendor leading to the Jasmine revolution and the sudden assertive
actions of both Hamas and Israel, leading to armed conflict .
However, if American policymakers only stick to the ‘one size fits all’ liberal
approach of democracy promotion and economic interdependence all the time, chances are
that US could not react with fast-changing challenges effectively and timely to gain and
safeguard national interests since the liberal approach could not be easily adjusted. In
particular, economic interdependence and democratization, even if they could really work, it
would take time to develop before they could result in the lofty goals of pacifying
international relations. However, they are not in the same pace with the dynamic changes in
MENA political and social situations and realism thus still dominates in the US grand
strategy towards Arab regimes. It is thus not surprising that the liberal approach fails to
explain the realist way of supporting Arab autocracies.

A revised national interest analysis
More specifically, there are manyexceptionallydangerous threats specifically
threatening each domain of US overriding national interests in MENA, further forcing US to
adopt a more realist way. In the Arab world, US national interests, instead of liberal ideals,
mostly lie in power (counterterrorism, regional balance of power), peace (Arab-Israel peace),
and economic prosperity (stable supply of oil). As for democracy as a national interest, they
are not discussed separately here but to be discussed as an opportunity cost of regime
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collapse to America due to democratization because the principal aim of this research is to
uncover the rationales behind US prolonged supports to Arab dictators, and why US
democracy promotion agenda is overwhelmed by other realist national interests concernsas
mentioned above.
Unlike the national-interest analysis in the existing literature, this part of the research
would propose a fresh angle/frameworkof national interest analysis by examining the basic
US national interests in MENA first, so that one could have some basic theoretical
knowledge of what America pursues in MENA, then followed by an intensive study of the
correspondingcurrent threats to these national interests , and then the analysis of possible
authoritarian regimes’ contributionto US regional interests and lastly the expectednegative
consequences of friendly Arab regimecollapsesso that one would understand , specifically,
how each regime fits into the US regional interests and the opportunity costs of America’s
high willingness to pursue those interests by aiding autocracies at the expense of idealism.
Although this section would mainly use second-hand information from a variety of journal
articles, withdetailed analyses regarding US regional interests, current threats and the
opportunity costs of regime collapse, the explanatory power of national interest analysis
would be greatly enhanced. Only by so doing could we have a systematic, step-wise and
detailed understanding on the US rational cost-benefit calculationsin terms of aiding Arab
autocraciesfrom the realist self-interest view. If not, one could only havemere information
aboutthe interactions between these Arab regimes and US government (regime contribution
in general and examples of US aids to those regimes).
Power as a national interest: counterterrorism and regional balance of power
From the perspective of realism, power plays the single most important role in US
foreign policy on the grounds that in an anarchic international system, relative
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gains/dominance in power capabilities could serve the interests of security concerns such as
self-defence, national independence and territorial integrity, national glory (Jentleson, 2010).
In particular, power, often expressed in military, political and economic forms, could have
the capabilities of influencing over other states such as forcing other states to abide by the
America’s will, self-interest and deterrence/pre-emptive power, all of whichwould guard
America against foreign attacks or even facilitate the achievements of other agendas like
peace and economic prosperity (Jentleson, 2010; Huntington,1993).
In the MENA context, there are two national interests related to the pursuit of power,
which are security-related issues such as counterterrorism and regional balance of power. The
911 attack has posed a series of threats to America national interests such as huge costs in
human lives of almost 3000 deaths and over 6000 injured, significant economic losses,
extensive psychological scars, racial disharmony over the issue of Muslim Americans,
pandemic health crisis by the Anthrax attacks, all of which impacts were comparable to the
Pearl Harbour attack, threatening almost every sphere of America security interests (Walt,
2002). Therefore, counterterrorism has been a vitally important factor in America’s regional
power issue in a bid to eliminate terrorism by all possible means. Should America be able
todefeat Islamic terrorism by powerful proactive responses and robust actions, America could
not only resolve the national security issue, minimize external shocks to American economy
and enhance social morale and cohesion, but America could also have a showcase of her
military and political strength, pre-empting the threatsposed by other hostile countries to
America.
Nowadays, America’s regional balance of power issue could be linked to
thegeostrategic concerns about the rise of a revisionist Shiite Islamized Iran, making the
prevention of the expanding Iran’s sphere of influence one of the US regional agendas. Apart
from Iran’s anti-Israel/Western Islamic fundamentalism, there are also other issues
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threatening US interests such as Iran’s possible acquisition of nuclear weapons, Iran’s
supports to the Assad regime, state-sponsored terrorism and hostilities towards other proAmerican Sunni neighbours (Barzegar, 2010). If America could successfully keep the power
of rising Iran in check and maintain a stable regional balance of power, doing so would
remedy the problems of the nuclear threats against America, safeguard Israel’s survival,
prevent security dilemma in MENA, and thereby ensure the stable supply of oil and most
importantly, doing so would curb the spread of Islamic extremists, jihadists and maintain US
hegemonic role at least in the region and the political quagmire in Syria may also be
remedied, all of which are of paramount importance to US.
Besides direct military crackdowns on terrorists, America could build up an
international coalition on counterterrorism by seeking cooperation from other friendly Arab
autocracies because of their home-field advantages in terms of intelligence gathering since
information could be easily collected by local law enforcement ,informal community
relations and military presence in the terrorism-stricken areas (Walt, 2002 :Byman, 2007).
For examples, the Mubarak, Saleh, Al-Saud regimes could live up to this role as shown by
Egypt’s great ability in capturing terrorists related to the 1993 World Trade Center Bombing
by detaining and torturing them in Egypt and Mubarak had also imprisoned many Muslim
Brotherhood members along with many extraordinary renditions of suspected terrorists and
Saleh and the Al-Saud monarchy have also assisted in fighting the Al-Qaeda stronghold in
the Arabian peninsula (Prados & Blanchard, 2007: Sharp, 2010:Brownlee, 2012a) .
The same also applies to the balance of power theory. When there is one revisionist
state seeking dominance , other states would join together to balance it, so that the revisionist
state would be less likely to initiate conflicts in the face of symmetrical power and the status
quo of the stable international system could be restored (Mingst &Arreguín-Toft, 2010).
Thus, the balance of power effects by Sunni Bahrain and Saudi Arabia are of particular
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importance to US regional interests because of their Sunni monarchies, close physical
proximity to Iran/the fifth naval fleet in Bahrain and Saudi Arabia, apart from suppressing
Shiite Arabs in the eastern province, has also provided lots of financial/military supports to
Bahrain to counter Iran’s influence such as the construction of the King Fahd Causeway in
the name of the GCC (Mabon, 2012).
Though the Mubarak and Saleh regimes have been ousted, the expected consequences
before their ousters are worthwhile to be examined , so as to shed some light on the
opportunity costs of US prolonged supports for these two regimes/the Al-Saud regime at that
time. As deduced from Brownlee (2012b):Prados & Sharp (2007):Sharp (2010):
Blanchard(2010): Prados & Blanchard (2007) Freemuse.org (2006): Byman et al.(2011),
should US does not support Mubarak, Saleh ,Al-Saud and turn a green light to sudden
democratization and free elections, chances are that the opportunity costs would be too high
to bear since , in addition to the current international threats of terrorism, these regimes may
fail in light of the populist sentiments against the regimes’ poor legitimacy, especially during
the era of Arab awakening when these autocracies suffer from intense public pressure and
there is no guarantee that the democratized regimes would be pro-American after free
elections .On the contrary, illiberal democracies, defined as ‘freely-elected regimes that fail
to fully protect basic freedom and human rights….without tolerance of opposition and
secularism’, may be produced since ‘the newly-free groups’ may rise and make revenges on
the former oppressors violently, which destabilize the whole countries ,as manifested by the
example of the anti-American/Israeli Hamas takeover of Gaza Strip (Payne, 2012: Snow,
2012: Kirkpatrick, 2012).
Given the long-standing institutionalized discrimination against Shiites by these Sunni
regimes ranging from political freedom to educational, economic opportunities suggested by
Mabon (2012), if these two regimes suddenly collapse, it is deduced that the opportunity
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costs would be very high sinceit may further embolden the assertive actions bylong-standing
Shiite oppositions in Bahrain and Eastern Province of Saudi Arabia, as a means to improve
their impoverished living conditions. Even worse, there has been a coup d’état in 1981
against Al-Khalifa by the Shiite Islamic Front with alleged support from Iran’s Islamic
Revolutionary Corps (Byman et al.,2011). Some Shiite Bahraini clerics such as Abd-alWahab Husein ,who led the al-Haq party, also sympathizes with Hizballah (Byman et
al.,2011). Therefore, if these two regimes are toppled, the balance of power between Shia and
Sunni may well be upset by extreme Shiite takeovers, which threaten not only other friendly
Sunni regimes, but also the stability of the Persian Gulf and Israel, given Iran’s nuclear
program.
Peace as a national interest: Arab-Israel peace
Peace is also an important national goal of American foreign policy and it is also the
ultimate objective of the rest of three goals since ‘that is what power is supposed to safeguard,
what prosperity is supposed to contribute to, what principles are supposed to undergird’
(Jentleson, 2010). Arab-Israel peace has been a long-standing issue in US foreign policy
towards the region as manifested by the repeated US attempts to settle conflicts such as the
Madrid Conference 1991, the Camp David Summit 2000 and the Obama administration’s
initiatives to peace process, of which agenda was to achieve ‘peaceful settlement of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict’and Obama also appointed George Mitchell----anexperienced
peace-broker as a Special Envoy for Middle East Peace (Fox News, 2009, BBC News, 2007).
The reasons stem from the belief that Israel-Palestine peace could remedy the rise of
Iran and its nuclear program, as manifested by the statement by former US Secretary of
Defence Robert Gates in a press conference: ‘the lack of progress in the peace process has
provided political ammunition to our adversaries in the Middle East and in the region, and
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that progress in this arena will enable us not only to perhaps get others to support the peace
process, but also support us in our efforts to try and impose effective sanctions against Iran’
(US Department of Defence, 2010). In particular, it is expected that Arab countries would be
more willing to cooperate with America since Iran’s rhetoric built on Arab frustration
associated with the ‘unjust’ American actions would lose grounds if the peace process is
successful ;and regional anti-Americanism associated with US unjust favouritism towards
Israel would also lessen , so the appeal of Islamic radicalism by terrorists would also be
dampened (Gilboa, 2009: Malka, 2012: Petraeus ,2010).
However, the threats are that the peace process remains mediocre and US is often
seen as an dishonest broker, leading to Arab discontents or even rhetoric from the Iranian
clerics to destroy Israel. For example, because of Israel assertive actions, it was found that
83.7% of Arabs in the region did not accept the existence of Israel and 59.6% of them even
agreed with the Arab possession of nuclear weapons against the nuclear proliferation in Israel,
according to a survey by Tausch (2013). During the Ahmadinejad administration, he also
stated that Israel should be ‘wiped off the map’ in a Conference called ‘the World Without
Zionism’ in 2005 and Iran also delivered weapons to Hezbollah in 2013 by a Syrian convoy,
which was stuck by Israel Defense Force (Reuters, 2013:IRIB News, 2005).
In this respect, the value of the Mubarak regime to the Israeli national security was of
particular importance (Brownlee, 2012b). Ever since the Sadat administration and the Camp
David Accord, Egypt has been the first Arab regime to establish and maintained bilateral
relations/certain degree of cooperation with Israel such as the closure of the Egypt-Gaza
border upon the Hamas takeover, albeit with diverging views on the issue of peace process
and occasional condemnation on Israeli’s assertive actions towards other Arab countries and
US unfair favouritism towards Israel (Brownlee, 2012b). Upon Israel’s unilateral
‘disengagement plan’ from the Gaza Strip in 2003, the Ministry of Defense under the
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Mubarak administration had also played the role of security provider in Gaza and equipped
the Palestinian security forces (Brownlee, 2012b).
In America’s rationale before the ouster of Mubarak, it was logical to deduce that
policymakers would think that there would be high opportunity costs if America withdrew
supports since the Mubarak regime would collapse and end up with no any better alternatives,
adding up to the regional hostilities against Israel. Among all MENA countries, Egypt is one
of the three, along with Jordan and Turkey, to have a peace treaty and diplomatic relationship
with Israel (Safty, 1991). Thus, an anti-American/Israel regime could probably lead to
widespread instabilities and Arab-Israel conflicts again (Safty, 1991). These views gained
salience when the Egyptian public opinions almost rejected totally the Egyptian-US-Israel
strategic relationships (Black, 2011). Thus, the potential opposition figures including
religious conservatives and secular nationalists in a democratized society may well reverse
the policies of favouritism towards US and Israel, especially when the succeeding regime
turns out to be strongly authoritarian and Islamic (Black, 2011).
Prosperity as a national interest: ensuring the stable supply of oil
Prosperity is usually linked to economic national interests, which aims to, on one
hand, bring welfares to American people as well as to those economic elites and capitalists
with profits drawing from transnational business, investments (Jentleson, 2010). In the
MENA context, oil has played a very significant role. After the WWII, US economy has
become increasingly oil-driven, especially in the case of transportation sectors and
manufacturing industries , consuming a total of 68.9% of oil in America (U.S. Bureau of
Transportation Statistics, 2007:US Congress, 2008). Even with the ‘Strategic Petroleum
Reserve’ and indigenous oil fields, MENA is still a very important source of crude oil, with
its 40% share in the global oil supply market and most of which oil exports go to the US with
a rate from 24% in 1970 to 65% in 2005, with 3,324 million barrels of crude oil exporting to
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America in 2011 and the growth rate is likely to be 75% by 2015 (Boaz , 2008,Hudson , 1996,
Forbes.com, 2005, Pleven, 2011, U.S. Census Bureau, 2011 ,Hassassian 1997,Barr,
2012:Momayezi & Rosenburg: 2011). America thus has to maintain good relations with those
Arab oil-producing countries in MENA, so as to gain comparative advantages in oil
acquisition.
However, there are different threats to the stable oil supply to America. Firstly,
although there are new discoveries of oil sources other than MENA, there have been
increasing competitions for fossil fuels from other countries such as China and India and in
the case of China, it is expected that the oil consumption level would increase from 7.7 MBD
in 2008 to 16.3 MBD by 2030 (Lyon et al., 2010). Secondly, the scope and effect of the
Jasmine Revolution are still far from certain and the civil unrests and protests in Libya,
Tunisia, Egypt, Yemen, Bahrain, Iran, Morocco, Syria have already caused worries in the
global oil market, leading to fluctuations in oil prices during the Tunisian and Libyan
revolution (Momayezi &Rosenburg: 2011)
Thus, among all Arab countries, Saudi Arabia is of particular importance. On one
hand, the Al-Saud regime only suffered from mild protests because of the effective use of oil
rents to buy off the oppositions successfully, and on the other hand, it has the largest oil
reserve in the world and as a second-largest oil producer, it produced 9.5 million barrels of
crude oil each day in 2005 and accounted for 11.3% of overseas oil imports in America and
7.4% of oil consumption in America by 2004 and the Saudi regime even helped to adjust oil
prices by the gentlemen’s agreement within OPEC in 2000 (Prados & Blanchard, 2007:
Momayezi & Rosenburg: 2011).
The implication is that America will face high opportunity costs if the Al-Saud regime
collapses, not to mention the current international threats to oil export to America. If there
are internal instabilities or even regime collapse in Saudi Arabia as a result of US withdrawal
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of supports, as suggested by Rumsey (2012):Momayezi &Rosenburg (2011), they would lead
to price fluctuations in the oil market as a result of lower production, price speculation and
market fears for the threats to the oil transportation, as manifested by the cases of decreased
Libyan oil supply and a sharp increase of Tunisian oil from $20 per barrel to $113 per barrel
following the protests in 2011 and the rise of Libyan oil prices by 20%, even though Libya
only ranks 18th largest in global oil production .Thus if widespread unrests occur in Saudi
Arabia, the second largest global oil producer would have a disruptive impact on the global
oil supply ,not to mention the risk of extremists’ takeover and Iran assertive actions in the
Strait of Hormuz against Saudi Arabia and America , as pointed out by Momayezi
&Rosenburg (2011), all of which may even halt oil supply to US.
To sum up, the reasons for America to support Arab authoritarian regimes are that the
international conditions in MENA are exceptionally anarchic and dangerous to US national
interests in the region, and those regimes could offer almost secure deliveries of US national
interests. All these make the opportunity costs of losing them are too high for America.The
inflexible nature of liberal approach in relations to the changing MENA international
conditions, the liberal approach’s opposition to use force are also important points in this
issue.
Chapter III: the rationale for continued supports to/eventual abandonment of Arab
autocracies after/during the Arab Spring
As suggested by Dueck (2008): Trubowitz et al (1999), US foreign policy is not
always fixed and is subject to changes/modifications known as ‘the neoclassical realist model
of strategic adjustment’ of grand strategies, measured by the changes in a number of factors
such as the level of US political commitments as manifested by the size of foreign aids, size
of military deployment, the engagement and/or disengagements from diplomatic activities
and the changes would be further classified into ‘first-order change’ (significant changes),
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‘second-order change’(less significant changes) and ‘minor tinkering’ (Dueck ,2008). An
understanding of these changes could have some implications in the dynamics of US policy
towards friendly autocrats in the wake of Arab Spring starting from 2011 during which they
are challenged by increasing populist democratic forces (Byman, 2011)
Case studies: US foreign policy and Al-Saud Saudi Arabia in the wake of Arab Spring
In line with the ‘neoclassical realist grand strategy model’ by Dueck (2008), the US
foreign policy towards Saudi Arabia has only experienced ‘minor tinkering’ after /during the
Saudi revolution starting from 2011, despite Al-Saud repressive actions against civilian
protestors (Blanchard, 2014). For example, the Obama administration, since the late 2012,
has proposed arms sales worth over $20 billion including the continuation of the existing
training programs and the upgrade of the Saudi-owned US-fighter aircrafts by providing
‘advanced stand-off air weaponry’, and other existing joint-cooperation would also be likely
to continue so as to foster stronger bilateral links in national security, economic, educational
and interpersonal areas (Blanchard, 2014). In 2013, arms sales include the SANG
Modernization Program Extension and Mark V Patrol Boats, amounting to $4000 billion and
$1200 billion respectively and even in 2011 during the initial outbreak of Saudi Spring, US
arms sales to Saudi forces amounted to around $1 billion (Blanchard, 2014).
Although US officials often criticize the regime’s poor democracy and human rights
records and failure to conduct genuine reforms, these criticisms are reported to be confined to
occasions during ‘private diplomatic engagement’ instead of open criticism publicly because
of the overriding needs to continue the close bi-lateral cooperation and although an award
was given to a Saudi women right activist by the Department of State, US officials even
praised the King Abdullah administration for being ‘responsive and transparent’ to the voice
of protestors in the wake of the Saudi Revolution and cited the Saudi government efforts
since 2011 such as housing and employment-related social programs by the expulsion of
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foreign workers in Saudi Arabia , the expansion of the Shura Council with women included
in 2013 (US Department of State , 2012:Blanchard, 2014).
However, the facts remain ‘managed, limited political and social reforms’ such as the
arrest of women driving advocates and Shiite protestors in the Eastern Province and the
conviction of human right activists such as Mohammed al-Qahtani (US Department of State ,
2012:Blanchard, 2014). Furthermore, when the regime expressed discontent in 2013, such as
its rejection of non-permanent seats in the UNSC, over Washington’s reluctance to send
troops to Syria, America sent Secretary of State John Kerry to Saudi Arabia and assured the
Saudi Foreign Minister the importance of Saudi-US relations to America by saying that
‘Right now we have some very important things to talk about to make certain the Saudi-U.S.
relationship is on track, moving forward and doing the things that we need to accomplish’
and ‘We will be there for Saudi Arabia, for the Emirates…….. We will not allow those
countries to be attacked from outside. We will stand with them’ (Al Arabiya, 2013).
Case studies: US Foreign policy and Al-Khalifa Bahrain in the wake of Arab Spring
As for US foreign policy towards Bahrain, it could be classified as ‘second-order
change’, which is something less significant and more or less the continuation of existing
approach after the outbreak of unrest in 2011, as deduced from the neoclassical realist model
by Dueck (2008). For example, the Obama administration did not force Al-Khalifa to step
down amidst the Bahraini unrest, saying that along with Al-Khalifa good history of reform,
the force used by Bahrain was not as serious as those by Al-Qaddafi and Assad and the US
government also maintained that it has always expressed objections as to the use of force
against Bahraini protestors, as manifested by the five visits of the Assistant Secretary of State
to Bahrain in 2011 to facilitate political reforms and settlement (Katzman, 2012). However,
those are only rhetoric and the facts remain that the US government ‘downplayed the human
right abuse’ because of US national security concerns to contain Iran and even though there
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was a hold to sell armoured vehicles and anti-tank weapons as well as a reduction in military
aids to Bahrain initially because of the unrest, these arms sales resumed in mid-May 2012 so
as to increase the self-defense ability of the regime and balance the threat of Iran (Katzman,
2012). For example, 40% of the original $25 million military aids were provided to Bahrain
in FY 2012 and 2013 (Katzman, 2012). Furthermore, US officials even hoped to expand the
US naval facility in Bahrain in 2012 and had no plan of relocation of the naval base out of the
concern for feasibility and national interests and the US-Bahrain Bilateral Defence Pact
continues until today (Agence France Presse, 2011a: Katzman, 2012).
Case studies: US foreign policy and Mubarak Egypt in the wake of Arab Spring
When the neoclassical realist model by Dueck (2008) is applied to the policy towards
Mubarak Egypt, there was a major ‘first order’ change since Mubarak was said to be
‘abandoned’by America, albeit reluctantly, at last (Guzansky & Striem, 2013). During the
mounting Egyptian uprising, although America initially provided almost ‘unconditionally
supports’ to Mubarak, it later switched to support the former head of intelligence Omar
Suleiman or even the military as alternatives, and eventually Washington accepted the ouster
of Mubarak (Brownlee, 2012a). Initially on January 25 2011, Hilary Clinton only mentioned
words like restraint but did not ask Mubarak to step down and said that ‘our assessment is
that the Egyptian government is stable and is looking for ways to respond to the legitimate
needs and interests of the Egyptian people’ and refused to refer Mubarak as an dictator
(Waguih, 2011: Brownlee, 2012a: PBS, 2011).
However, things had some changes on Sunday as protesters posed increasing
challenges to the regime, when Clinton said ‘an orderly transition’was needed so that US
could, because of such a ‘limited leadership change’, on one hand maintained stability and
seemed to answer the call for democracy on the other hand by transferring power to
Suleiman(Landler, 2011: Brownlee, 2012a). As demonstrations continued, there were over 1
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million people in Cairo urging Mubarak to step down ‘right away’ instead of waiting until the
expiration of his term on September, prompting Obama to issue a statement ‘orderly
transitions must be meaningful, it must be peaceful, and it must begin now’ and started to
‘turn Mubarak into a lame duck’ by working with Egyptian military and Omar Suleiman to
facilitate power transition to Omar Suleiman (Sanger, 2011:Brownlee, 2012a: Cooper et
al,2011).
After the ‘Battle of Camel’, gunshots targeting protestors and the failure to disperse
the protestors, Washington’s desire to substitute Mubarak by the vice president of the time
Omar Suleiman were reaffirmed and later because of other subsequent events such as the
rising political activism, cross-sector nation-wide protests triggered by the satellite TV
broadcast of the Google Executive, Mubarak unwillingness to transfer power and Suleiman’s
inability, US asked for a more ‘serious transition’ and the SCAF Egyptian military people
subsequently intervened and ousted Mubarak and Obama then approved the SCAF
actions‘‘to depose Mubarak , suspend the Constitution, and lead Egypt until new elections
were organized’ and the SCAF also proposed to reforms and facilitate ‘‘clean and free
presidential electionafter current conditions passed’’and Obama also said ‘The people of
Egypt have spoken, their voices have been heard, and Egypt will never be the same’(The
White House , 2011a & b:Beinin & Vairel, 2011: Sanger & Kirkpatrick, 2011: Brownlee,
2012b: SCAF, 2011: Weaver &Mccarthy, 2013).
As for US aids to Mubarak Egypt, following the use of live fires against protestors,
the White House spokesman said that aids to Egypt were also ‘under review’, especially the
military aids which are subject to changes in events as US monitored the crisis unfolding
during the 2011 uprising (The White House, 2011c). However, Washington had been
unwilling to ‘severe or freeze aids’ for national interests reasons (The White House, 2011c).
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Case studies: US Foreign policy and Saleh Yemen in the wake of Arab Spring
By the same token, US policy towards Saleh in Yemen has also undergone a ‘firstorder change’, in line with the neoclassical realist model by Dueck (2008). Similar to the case
of Mubarak Egypt, US initially expressed supports to Saleh and did not ask Saleh to resign
explicitly, as manifested by the words of US Deputy National Security Adviser ‘I think our
view is that there’s clearly going to have to be a political situation in Yemen that includes a
government that is more responsive to the Yemeni people’ and US military and economic
assistance worth $ 115 million were even requested to aid Saleh Yemen in the wake of unrest
in February 2011 for the FY 2012 (Sharp, 2011).
However, after violence against protestors and mounting tensions, Washington had
started to think about the possibility of a ‘‘negotiated exit’ for Saleh’’ and a transfer of power
to the vice president Hadi on April 3(Kasinof & Sanger, 2011). On April 8, Washington
expressed the view that GCC-deal would work, of which content was about ‘Saleh’s timely
resignation’ (US Department of State, 2011). When Saleh refused to accept the GCC deal on
power transfer, Hilary Clinton was disappointed and ‘urged him to accept the initiative’and
Obama also expressed similar views on May 25 that ‘We call upon President Saleh to move
immediately on his commitment to transfer power’ (Ibtimes Staff Reporter, 2011: Agence
France-presse, 2011b).
Although Saleh had survived though the assassination attempt by the hospitalization
in Saudi Arabia, US advised that Saleh should not be re-admissible to Yemen (The
Huffington Post, 2011a). As for US aids to Saleh, there had indeed been a reduction in
military assistance , dropping from $176 million in 2010 to only $30 million in 2011 upon
Saleh’s use of force to attack unarmed civilian protestors and the aids were restored to normal
levels when Saleh was succeed by Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi (DeYoung, 2012).
Furthermore, a Presidential executive order was also made in 2012 freezing anyone’s assets
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in US if deemed to support Saleh and spoil the political transition to Hadi, and this order
targeted especially Saleh relatives and supporters in the political and military sectors
(DeYoung, 2012).
Reasons: International condition/pressure
As suggested by neoclassical realist grand strategy model , ‘strategic adjustment in
foreign policy’ would occur due to threatening international conditions/pressures (Doyle,
1997:Gilpin, 1986: Christensen, 1996:Dueck, 2008).For examples in the international
conditions analysis by Petras (2011),it includes the pro-American regimes ability/inability to
cope with protests, military loyalty/defection and the absence/existence of viable
alternatives ,all of which could explain the differences in US foreign policy responses
towards the Mubarak Egypt, Saleh Yemen, Al-Saud Saudi Arabia, Al-Khalifa Bahrain. In
addition, the asset mobility approach and US domestic politics analysis could also play some
roles in the explanations here.
US foreign policy and Regime capability to cope with protests
First of all, it is the factor of regime capability to cope with protests suggested by
Petras (2011). This factor is one of the most important factors to determine the regime
ability/resilience to survive, as manifested in the 3rdwave of democratization and thus weak
regime capabilities to withstand popular protests would easily lead to regime collapse
eventually (Huntington, 1991). Therefore, the level of uncontrolled protests would affect the
reliability for Washington to depend on regimes to gain benefits and the significance of this
factor could be manifested in the Washington eventual abandonment of Mubarak and Saleh,
in contrast to Washington continued support to Saudi Arabia and Bahrain.
In the case of Mubarak, it was obvious that the popular protests/unrests starting from
January were far beyond Mubarak’s control and should the military fail to step in, the protests
are likely to continue days after days.
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On Jan 25, 2011, the ‘Day of Rage’ began with thousands of protestors demonstrating
against the Interior Minister, poor wages, Emergency law in Tahrir Square, and similar
protests had also spread to other Egyptian cities (ICG, 2011a: Brownlee, 2012a). Although
protestors were hit by tear gas and rubber bullets and internet access and text messages were
shut down, an addition of tens of thousands protestors went to Tahrir Square on January 28
demanding the end of the regime and they ‘outnumbered security forces by a million or more,
shocking the Interior Minister and the president’ (ICG, 2011a: Brownlee, 2012a: ElGhobashy, 2011). On February 1, the streets in Cairo were already filled with more than 1
million protestors and despite the attacks by Mubarak’s police and ‘thugs on horseback and
camelback’ ending up with 1000 injuries on February 2, the Tahrir Square was filled with
‘over one hundred thousand people’ on February 4 (Schemm& Lucas, 2011: Shokr,
2011:Brownlee, 2012a).
Despite the vice president Omar Suleiman telling people to go home, tensions
mounted on February 10 with nationwide workers’ strikes, leading to the eventual military
action to force out Mubarak from power with the agreement with the USA (Brownlee, 2012a:
ABC News, 2011: CNN, 2011a).Thus, with all these ever escalating regime-civilian tensions,
the number of demonstrators as manifested in the timeline from the political rally in Tahrir
Square to Mubarak’s repeated failure to quell the protests, nationwide strike and subsequent
military coup, America could sense that he could no longer effectively deliver America’s
interests and Mubarak would collapse eventually no matter how hard the regime was to
suppress the mass protests. Washington’s calculation was that it was to US benefits to give up
Mubarak eventually so as to foster closer cooperation with the potential rulers in the future. If
not, Mubarak would become a liability to US and generate far more popular antiAmericanism in the post-Mubarak era, which would further hurt America’s interests in Egypt
by damaging the prospects of America-Egypt cooperation in the future.
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Similar scenarios also happened in Yemen during the Saleh era, which was proved to
be incapable to withstand popular pressure, and America thus withdrew supports for similar
reasons as shown by the case of Mubarak Egypt.
On January 27, 2011, the streets of Sanaa were filled with 16000 protestors
demanding the resignation of Saleh and on February 2, despite President Saleh’s
announcement of no desire to be re-elected, Sanaa was filled by over 20,000 protestors on the
‘Day of Rage’ on February 3 and protests later spread to other parts of the country in March,
involving hundreds of thousands people calling it a ‘Tuesday of Rage’ (Al Jazeera, 2011a:
Arabia Today, 2011). Despite subsequent government brutal crackdowns injuring and killing
several dozen protestors on March 4,6,8, 12, and the declaration of state of emergency
March18, Saleh faced ‘calls for resignation’ from his tribe together with the resignation of
Yemen ambassador to the UN and the deflection of military commanders, Obama’s calls for
resignation (Al Jazeera, 2011a: Arabia Today, 2011).
Later, in spite of Saleh initial resistance to the GCC power transfer plan on April 8, he
was seriously injured by a bomb attack in a mosque and he subsequently signed the GCC
plan on November 2011 in Saudi Arabia and formally resigned on February 2012 (Finn,
2011:Ahramonline, 2011 Mounassar, 2012). Therefore, as shown in the timeline starting
from initial demonstrations in Sanaa to later tribal/GCC’s call for resignation and the
subsequent assassination attempt against him, Saleh’s ability to quell popular uprisings was
proved to be overwhelmed by the ever increasing scale of popular demonstration, despite
repeated violent crackdowns on civilians and Saleh’s departure was counting days also
because of increasing pressure from other neighbouring countries, most notably Saudi
Arabia.America thus has every major reason to drop Saleh for fear that continued America
supports would impede US-Yemen cooperation in counterterrorism against Al-Qaeda in the
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future, given increasing popular anti-Americanism in the post-Saleh era and the worsening
relations with the GCC countries, not to mention the ongoing AQAP terrorism in the country.
However, as for Saudi Arabia, the story is different. Up till now, the Al-Saud regime
has been quite stable and America thus continues to support the Saudi regime even in the
wake of civilian protests since without the prospect of regime collapse since the Al-Saud
regime is more dependable to deliver US national interests such as oil and counterterrorism in
the long run. For example, although there had been attempts to used Facebook as a media for
mobilization purposes and to learn from the Egyptian Tahrir Square model to organize ‘Day
of Rage’ in 2011, such attempts were successfully ‘pre-empted’ by a large number of
nationwide Saudi police and security forces presence; demonstrators were also intimated by
the extremely repressive, conservative Wahhabi clerics , making the number of protesters of
‘Day of Rage only ‘several hundred people’ and only limited to the Shiite-concentrated
Eastern Province and those feminists fighting for the women rights (Stewart, 2011: Byman et
al., 2011:Banerjee, 2011).
However, those Saudi Shiites minorities, numbered only 10-15% of the population
and ‘only a few hundred of them’ joined subsequent demonstrations in the rest of 2011 and
2012 and the whole Saudi Revolution only amounts to a few thousand protestors till now and
for Saudi feminists, their main goal is to increase women’s rights such as the right to drive,
electoral rights but not to overthrow the Al-Saud regime (Alsharif & Benham, 2011:Byman et
al., 2011:Lugo et al., 2009:Shaheen, 2011: Al Jazeera, 2011b: Press TV, 2011). Thus, it is
clear that the Saudi monarchy thus faces no any significant threat so far and is highly unlikely
to collapse with its large-scale, frightening repression since regardless of protestors’ calls for
reform, those demonstrators were only marginal segments of the Saudi society such as Shiite
Saudis and Saudi women, not to mention the only a small number of them participating in
protests and America is thus reluctant to drop Al-Saud because US can comfortably continue
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to cooperate closely with its Saudi counterparts, without any fear of significant popular antiAmericanism and threats damaging US interests such as counterterrorism and balancing Iran
in the future.
Likewise, Washington does not abandon the Al-Khalifa Bahraini monarchy because
of the perceived Bahraini regime stability. Although the civil unrests starting from 2011
posed a serious threat to the monarchy, the regime was strengthened by the arrival of troops
from Saudi Arabia and other Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries to carry out brutal
crackdown against protestors and the imposition of martial law (Mcevers, 2012).
Admittedly, in the initial stage,the government was a bit overwhelmed by Shiite
protestors with tens of thousands protestors occupying the Pearl Roundabout for several
weeks, with the numbers of protestors rising from 100,000 to 300000 with several resignation
of Shiite Parliamentarians (Slackman& Audi, 2011: ICG, 2011b: The Hindu, 2013).However,
protests had started to decline following the arrival of GCC troops accompanied by more
forceful crackdown, during which 1000 Saudi army and 500 UAE and Qatar policemen
protected Bahraini strategic positions and stationed in military checkpoints alongside
Bahraini military in Manama and the monarchy itself also issued a state of emergency,
banning all protests with 5000 security forces engaging in the Pearl Roundabout crackdown
on March 16 and arresting more than 1000 protestors on March 17 and demolishing the Pearl
Roundabout on March 18 eventually (Bassiouni et al. 2011: Welsh &Laumea, 2011: CNN,
2011b: ICG, 2011b).
In addition, many Shiite mosques were destroyed in April and Shiite workers were
laid off in May and even with protests, people were effectively and quickly ‘forced off the
streets by security forces’ and Bahrain citizenships of some Shiite protestors were also
revoked (Bassiouni et al. 2011:Welsh &Laumea, 2011: ICG, 2011b: The Hindu, 2013).
Therefore, with the help from GCC troops in stabilizing the situation and the regime’s
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forceful reactions, America would not want to drop Al-Khalifa since US is likely to perceive
that the Bahraini regime is still reliable and strong enough to protect US interests such as the
naval base and countering the Iran’s rise, as manifested by the absence of large-scale protests
after the GCC and Bahraini authorities’ violent crackdown and total ban of protests. America,
at least up to this moment, could count on its GCC counterparts to derive national interests in
Bahrain without any threats of damaging national interests in the long term.
US foreign policy and military loyalty to the regime
Another factor influencing US foreign policy decision to continue to support or
abandon the friendly Arab authoritarian regimes should be military loyalty, as pointed out by
Petras (2011). To elaborate, this factor is important in the sense that it is , firstly, linked to
regime survival. If the military, amidst domestic unrests, chooses to deflect to the protesters’
sides, chances are that the regime would lose the most important coercive apparatus and the
power balance would tilt towards the protestors (Gause III, 2011). Once again, if the Arab
regime is not likely to survive in the future, it is advisable to abandon the regime/rulers as
soon as possible, albeit in a controllable fashion, so as to develop relationships with the
leaders during the regime collapse period to pave for the way to cooperate. Among the case
studies of Mubarak Egypt, Saleh Yemen, Al-Saud Saudi Arabia and Al-Khalifa Bahrain, only
the first two’s military deflected to the protesters’ side amidst the Arab Spring and this also
explains why US would give up Mubarak and Saleh in the end.
In the case of Egyptian military, although it initially supported Mubarak, it later
switched sides. (Brownlee, 2012b). For example, although the Egyptian military later was
pulled out of barracks to the streets of Cairo and were given orders to shoot civilian protestors,
those commanders refused to attack Egyptian citizens in the Tahrir Square and the military
later also formally announced that ‘they would not fire upon demonstrators’, although it did
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not mean that the military was protecting civilians (Shadid, 2011:Brownlee, 2012b).When
Mubarak refused to relinquish power quickly, the military also joined hands with American
officials and Omar Suleiman to facilitate the process (Cooper et al, 2011). Following
Mubarak and Suleiman’s failure to lessen the unrest, the military started to intervene and
issued a communiqué saying that ‘they would remain in session indefinitely and take
appropriate measures to safeguard the nation and the achievements of the Egyptian people’
and then the military ‘deposed Mubarak’ and the whole country was ruled by Field Marshal
Tantawi and other generals (SCAF, 2011: Brownlee, 2012b).
Now that the Egyptian military had emerged to become the real boss of Egypt,
Mubarak’s power had been hollowed out and he was doomed to be stripped of power no
matter how hard he resisted since he had lost the main apparatus to coerce Egyptian civilians
to follow his will and further supports to him would only make the matter worst with not only
anti-Americanism from the Egyptian public ,but also from the Egyptian military. America
thus gave up Mubarak when the military successful forced him out of power.
For the case of Yemeni military, one could also spot the split of Yemeni military in
the wake of widespread social unrests because of different ‘tribal affiliation’ (Barany,
2011).Military units belonging to the same tribes/friendly tribes to Saleh and his families
generally backed Saleh, while the rest of other units either sided with the protestors or just
remained neutral (Gause III, 2011). For example, after the outbreak of Yemen Revolution
2011, there were defections of 12 military commanders, senior generals to protestors’ side in
Sanaa along with many of their soldiers and among their commanders defected, they include
‘‘Brigadier Hameed Al Koshebi, head of brigade 310 in Omran area, Brigadier Mohammed
Ali Mohsen, head of the eastern division, Brigadier Nasser Eljahori, head of brigade 121,
General Ali AbdullahaAliewa, adviser of the Yemeni supreme leader of the army’’ and most
importantly, General Ali Moshen al-Ahmar also defected ,notwithstanding being a friend of
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President Saleh from the same tribe (Al Jazeera, 2011c: Barany, 2011: Finn, 2011). Although
Saleh depended on Republican Guard, Central Security Forces, he later suffered from an
assassination attempt ‘by a dissident unit on the Presidential Compound’ (Barany, 2011:
Dorsey, 2011).
Therefore, President Saleh was in a much more inferior position than anti-government
protestors when even his tribal friend revolted , not to mention the massive military
defections and official resignations, losing much more of the coercive power alongside his
popular legitimacy to rule. Even if America continued to support him, he would collapse one
day and America thus would have no reason to stick with Saleh due to a sharp drop in Saleh’s
value and utility. Saleh had become more of a liability than anything else.
US foreign policy and the existence of better alternatives
As pointed out by Petras (2011), the existence of better alternatives would also affect
US foreign policy decisions to stick to the status quo Arab autocracies or not.It could explain
by the concepts of ‘asset mobility’ and ‘the fear of redistributive pressure’, as suggested by
Brownlee (2012a). In particular, if there is only one ruler/regime being able to deliver
important America’s national interests in the MENA, Washington is very likely to stick with
it, however high the tension of the civil unrests is (Brownlee ,2012a). On the contrary, if there
are more than one persons/regimes being able to do so, America would likely to abandon the
original leader/regime (Brownlee ,2012a). This is what happened in Mubarak Egypt and
Saleh Yemen, but not in Al-Saud Saudi Arabia and Al-Khalifa Bahrain.
In the case of Mubarak Egypt, Egypt was characterized by its unique importance to
deliver America’s national interests such as Arab-Israel peace and counterterrorism, as
suggested by Brownlee (2012a). However, Mubarak is not the only one being able to do so,
leading to America’s decision to drop Mubarak. During the Egyptian Revolution 2011,
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America, from time to time, deemed that Omar Suleiman as a very suitable substitute to
Hosni Mubarak, as a form of ‘orderly and meaningful transition’ (Landler, 2011: Brownlee,
2012a).
The reason is that Omar Suleiman was also able to deliver the above US national
interests of counterterrorism and Arab-Israel peace. In terms of counterterrorism, Omar
Suleiman, as the intelligence chief, the purpose of extraordinary rendition was achieved since
Islamic terrorists were captured and transferred to Egyptian sites of detention and some of
them were also executed (Brownlee, 2012b). Indeed, the Egyptian General Intelligence
Services (GIS) headed by Omar Suleiman functioned like the CIA for overseas and domestic
intelligence collection to safeguard national security against Islamic terrorism, with arrests
and detention of Islamic terrorists amounting to 25000 times and 19000persons respectively,
killing and injuring 1106 persons in the war against Islamic terrorism (Springborg, 1989:
Brownlee, 2012b).
In terms of peace with Israel, Suleiman also lived up to this role. For example, his
efforts led to the peace between Israel and Hamas in June 2008 (Navarro, 2008). He also
sought to improve Israel-Palestine relations by persuading Israeli and US officials to give
more credits to Fatah by improving Gaza conditions and telling US Embassy in Cairo that
‘the Israelis must help Abbas’ and asserted that ‘his agents would helped Fatah and worked
closely with Israeli officials to secure to release of Sahlit’ and there was a ‘hotline’ between
Suleiman and Israel Ministry of Defense for daily updating purposes and Israel was reported
to depend more on Suleiman than Mubarak (Wikileaks, 2008a: Wikileaks, 2008b: Brownlee,
2012b: Shen, 2008).
Apart from Omar Suleiman, the Egyptian military is also proved to be capable of
doing these two tasks. It is not surprising that towards the end of Mubarak presidency when
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the military tried to depose Mubarak from power, Washington approved the military
leadership immediately following the ouster of Mubarak (Brownlee, 2012b). Thus, US assets
are not only fixed on Mubarak since even when Mubarak was deposed, US assets would still
be able to depend on the military side, ending up with low redistributive pressure and high
asset mobility in Brownlee’s language.
Firstly, the Egyptian military and US government had been maintaining a longstanding close relationship ever since the conclusion of Egyptian-Israeli peace treaty in 1979
Camp David Accord (Abul-Magd, 2013). For example, there is a total sum of $1.3 billion
from US to the Egyptian military every year, as a part of the Foreign Military Financing
Program, including US training of Egyptian military officers, military sales of F-16 fighters,
Apache helicopters and MIAI Abraham tanks and all these have led to considerable longstanding America’s leverage ‘for more than three decades’ over the Egyptian military , as
suggested by one professor specializing in studying Egyptian military ‘Without that
sustainment money, planes won’t fly and tanks won’t drive’ (Abul-Magd, 2013: Schmitt,
2013).
In terms of counterterrorism, the Egyptian military has formed the Task Force 777
counterterrorism unit with US supports during the Sadat era and received trainings from the
US Army Delta Force (Ryan et al, 2004). In addition, the Egyptian military also conducts the
‘Bright Star’ military exercise with the US forces and other Western countries’ forces
biannually for regional security and counterterrorism purposes (Terrill, 2011).The Egyptian
military has also been avoiding hostilities against Israel. For example, although the Egyptian
Field Marshal Mohammed Hussein Tantawi rejected the US idea of placing ‘high-tech
surveillance’ to stop the smuggling in the Egypt-Gaza border in 2009 during the Israeli Gaza
Blockade, the Army ‘implanted a subterranean steel wall of nearly five inches thick running
from ten feet below the surface to more than sixty feet down’ and ‘became a symbol of the
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army’s part policing Gaza’ (Wikileaks, 2009: Brownlee, 2012b). In addition, the military
also honoured the peace treaty with Israel by placing only 750 border police officers with the
absence of heavy military vehicles (Sharp, 2008: Brownlee, 2012b).
Given the fact that both the Egyptian military and Omar Suleiman can safeguard
America’s asset in counterterrorism, Arab-Israel peace, America’s position could easily be
switched from Mubarak to either Omar Suleiman or the military, making Mubarak more of a
liability than the sole person to deliver US national interests and most importantly, there was
no harm done if America did not support Mubarak anymore since the status quo would
continue anyway, so such a low ‘redistributive pressure’ in the language of Brownlee(2012a)
contributed to America’s comfortable drop of Mubarak eventually when other conditions also
turned unfavourable, so as to yield more benefits in the future cooperation with the military
or Omar Suleiman.
As for Saleh Yemen, the GCC-deal of power transfer is likely to be the reason for US
willingness to drop Saleh in the Yemen Revolution 2011. Indeed, the Saudi-brokered GCC
power transfer plan stipulated that although Saleh could still bear the title of president and the
leader of his party (General People’s Congress (GPC), presidential powers should be
transferred to the Vice President al-Hadi in the 30-day period following the Saleh’s signature
of the deal, so that Saleh and his family members could enjoy ‘immunity from prosecution’
and a presidential election had to be held in 60 days to elect a new president (Durac, 2012:
Sohlman, 2011). However, this plan was an ‘inter-elite deal’, a ‘transfer of power within
current elites rather than fundamental changes’ without any involvement from the oppositions
such as the youth or the Houthi rebels in the negotiation stage nor did the GCC proposal live
up to the protestors’ demands for removing the corrupt system and instead, it promoted the
status quo power system and most importantly, because of the inherent weakness of other
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political actors, the GPC won again with its only Presidential candidate (Colombo, 2012:
Durac, 2012:Nevens, 2011).
Clearly, Al-Hadi Presidency would be more of a continuation of Saleh Presidency, as
expected in the Saudi-brokered GCC power transfer deal, in line with America’s expectation
(Durac, 2012). It is therefore understandable that all the previous cooperation between
Yemen and US on counterterrorism against the AQAP would continue with virtually no any
significant possibilities of Islamist takeover/genuine democratization. In the face of this
credible alternative together with Saudi Arabia’s efforts in brokering the power transfer
proposal and many unfavourable conditions against Saleh, Washington interests could switch
to Al-Hadi by dropping Saleh without any significant threats to US interests in Yemen
afterwards because of high ‘asset mobility’ and low ‘redistributive pressure’ hurting
America’s interests in counterterrorism, if one employs the language of Brownlee (2012a).
As for Al-Saud Saudi Arabia and Al-Khalifa Bahrain, however, things are entirely
different since there are not better alternatives to deliver America’s national interests in
counterterrorism against Al-Qaeda , for example, securing oil supply and maintaining a
power balance against the Shiite anti-America Iran, if the status quo regimes collapse,
making a high level of ‘asset immobility’ and ‘redistributive pressure’ in the language of
Brownlee (2012a). Should America drop the dictators like Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa
monarchies, chances are that there may be extremists’ takeover, who threaten America’s
interests.
This scenario is especially likely in the case of Bahrain of which the Sunni monarchy
governed the majority of Shiite population, who was deemed, in the eyes of the West and the
monarchy, to have links with the radical anti-Semitic, anti-American Iranian leader Khomeini,
sparking of great mutual mistrusts, as manifested by Iran’s claim of Bahrain, Iran’s
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involvement in the IFLB coup d’état in 1981, 1996 and the 1994 Iran-backed Shiite popular
uprising against the Bahraini monarchy (Ghanmi, 2009: Byman et al., 2011:Mabon,
2012).Given the fact that all the main political oppositions such as the Al-Wifaqare Shiites
are suspected to have ties with Iran , as pointed out by Byman et al. (2011), the ‘redistributive
pressure’ after the collapse of Al-Khalifa regime on US national interests are very high
because there is no any better alternative and the only alternative is the Iran-linked Shiites,
which is not feasible for US since it would lose national interests in the case of Shiite
takeover and this is further worsen by the fact that the US Fifth fleet naval base in Bahrain is
also immobile from the US perspective because of strategic and convenience reasons , as
indicated by Katzman (2012), Washington has no incentive to drop Al-Khalifa.
In the case of Al-Saud monarchy in Saudi Arabia, there is no doubt that the Saudi
regime ability to cope with popular protests/uprisings is very good since the Al-Saud controls
almost every arena of politics and there is no any systematic, well-organized internal popular
political opposition (Library of Congress, 2006). However, like Yemen, Saudi Arabia has
also been affected by presence of Al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) terrorists,
leading to ‘a vicious and violent struggle’ in Saudi Arabia from 2003 to 2006 with gunshots
and bombings in almost all Saudi cities so as to topple the Al-Saud regime, and even Prince
Nayif was almost killed by al-Qaeda and the AQAP has also been stronger these days since
the Yemeni authority has failed to effectively control beyond Sanaa (Byman et al., 2011).
Therefore, if America drops the Al-Saud regime, the alternative is definitely
extremists takeover, which is not a good idea to the US, and since US assets are almost
immobile in Saudi Arabia due to its status as one of the largest oil producers, and as one of
the greatest Sunni powers in the Arab world, the ‘redistributive pressure’ is very high and US
interests would definitely greatly suffer after regime collapse as a result of disrupted global
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oil supply, great shift power balance to Shiite Iran’s favour and that is why similar to the case
of Al-Khalifa, there is no incentive for US to abandon the Al-Saud regime.
US Domestic politics
In line with the neoclassical realist US grand strategy model by Dueck (2008), it is
fair to deduce that the US foreign policy changes towards friendly Arab autocracies could
also be explained US domestic liberal factors, albeit to a lesser extent, which could fulfil ‘the
filtering role’ and limit and change US foreign policy options towards Mubarak, Saleh, AlSaud, Al-Khalifa, on conditions that certain conditions are met. Thus, together with the realist
national interest and international conditions analysis, this US domestic politics analysis
could mutually reinforce each other to explain the US foreign policy changes towards
friendly Arab authoritarian regimes.
Congressional/senior security advisors opposition unity/disunity during the Arab Spring
As suggested by Jentleson (1990), the effects of congressional/senior advisory
opposing pressures work greatest during unity. By deduction, this could be the case of US
congressional/senior advisory dissenting pressures towards Mubarak and Saleh.
Although international conditions play the greatest role in the subsequent US policy
changes, the unified opinions, pressures from the senior national security advisors during the
wake of the Egyptian and Yemeni Revolution 2011 did also count. Furthermore, the
Congress , with the powers of oversight and budget control, also reacted to this Egypt and
Yemen Spring foreign policy crisis from the liberal side, President Obama’s realist policies
options towards Mubarak and Saleh were thus be filtered and suffered from lots of constraints,
forming parts of the reasons for policy changes, though to a lesser extent. Together with the
unfavourable US domestic politics/international conditions such as lack of regime capability
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to stop protests, military defection, the presence of other viable power alternatives, all these
lead to Obama’s eventual abandonment of Mubarak and Saleh.
However, this is not the case in US policies towards Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa, during
which there were no unified congressional/senior advisory voices to criticize the two dictators,
not to mention abandoning them and Obama thus faced no significant pressure from the
congress and senior advisors to drop Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa up till now.
In the case of the Egyptian Spring, there had been a consensus to abandon Mubarak in
favour of transition to Omar Suleiman among the senior security advisors such as Joe Biden
(the Vice President), Hilary Clinton (the Secretary of State), Robert Gates (the Defense
Secretary), Thomas Donlion (National Security Advisor) (Nicholas & Parsons, 2011:
Brownlee, 2012b). For senators, there also seemed to be a bipartisan consensus in forcing
Mubarak to go. For example, the Senate passed a resolution ,initiated by Sen.John Kerry (DMA)(Senate Foreign Relations Chairman) and Sen. John McClain (R-AZ)(Senate Armed
Services Committee) and supported by all 100 Senators, telling Mubarak to step down
immediately so that the caretaker government could initiate a transparent free election
process (Rogin, 2011).
There has also been a call from the Senate to temporarily stop military aids to
Mubarak such as by Sen. Patrick Leahy (D-VT) (the Senate Appropriations Subcommittee on
State and Foreign Ops.) and by Sen. Lindsey Graham (R-SC) (McArthur, 2011). Similar
positions were also expressed by congressmen in the House such as Rep. Ileana Ros-Lehtinen
(R-FL) (the head of the House of Representatives Foreign Affairs Committee) calls for
immediate popular elections in Egypt and also by Rep. Gary Ackerman(D-NY) (the ranking
Democrat on the House Subcommittee on the Middle East and South Asia) (Mohammed &
Spetalnick, 2011: Examiner.com, 2011).
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For the Yemen spring, the opinions of senior security advisors in the latter stage of the
revolution were also united. For example, Hilary Clinton (the Secretary of State) said that
Saleh must follow the GCC power-transfer deal and John Brennan (a high-ranking
counterterrorism adviser/the Homeland Security adviser) discussed with GCC countries on
how to make Saleh back to negotiation about his exit and another senior national security
official also said that other possible actions would be considered if the GCC-deal failed to
force Saleh to step down and said ‘We think it's in everyone's interest for Saleh to go’
(Ibtimes Staff Reporter, 2011: Entous & Coker, 2011: Sharp, 2011).
Although there was no large-scale congressional bipartisan statements/opinions on
this issue possibly because of the fact that the ties between Yemen and America is not as
extensive as that of Egypt, there had not been any significant voices from the Congress to
back Saleh and similar oppositions were also expressed by some members of Congress such
as by Sen. John McCain(R-AZ) and Republican Speaker of the House John Boehner saying
that Saleh should step down immediately and ‘receiving you (the Nobel Peace Prize Winner
Tawakul Karman) at U.S congress is acknowledgment of Yemeni Youth revolution’
respectively (Yemen Fox, 2011b: Yemen Fox, 2011a).
However, the congressional/senior advisory dissenting opinions to drop the Saudi and
Bahraini dictators were not unified enough and in some occasions, there were even absence
of such opinions or even opinions to keep America’s supports to Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa.
All these failed to create enough pressures upon President Obama to drop them in the wake of
Saudi and Bahraini Revolution starting from 2011.
In the case of Bahraini Spring, the congressional opinions were far from united and
nobody has ever asked King Al-Khalifa to step down. Some members of Congress neglected
the Bahraini crisis, during which Shiites were killed and injured and instead
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congressmen/senators continued to support Al-Khalifa and dismissed the use of sanctions
against the Bahraini monarchy ,as manifested by fact that Democrat Senator John Kerry
(Senate Foreign Relations Chairman) once remarked that ‘the Saudi –led GCC forces in
Bahrain was “not looking for violence in the streets” and they would like to encourage the
King and others to engage in reforms and a dialogue’(Mitchell, 2012:Swanson, 2014).
However, there were other senators such as Richard Durbin (D), Robert Casey(D),
Marco Rubio (R) and Ron Wyden (D) who pressured the Al-Khalifa monarchy to release a
human right activist named al-Khawaja and some such as Sen. Ron Wyden (D-OR) and U.S.
Rep. James McGovern (D-MA) also proposed a temporary halt of arms sales to the regime
and McGovern even argued that ‘human rights ought to matter in our foreign and military
policy’ (CNN, 2012: BCHR, 2011:Srour, 2014). Similar scenarios of supporting Al-Khalifa
also occurred among people in the senior advisory circles. For example, when the Defense
Secretary Robert Gates visited Bahrain during the Bahraini protests in 2012, he gave
reassurance to King Al-Khalifa that US would back the Al-Khalifa regime, which is a very
important ‘security partner’ in the region and the Secretary of State Hilary Clinton also gave
legitimacy of the Saudi-led GCC forces in Bahrain and acknowledged Al-Khalifa’s efforts to
facilitate the production of a report by the Bahrain Independent Commission of Inquiry
examining the Bahraini protests starting from 2011 (Mitchell, 2012:Zill, 2012: Ziezulewicz,
2012).
Similarly for the Saudi Spring, there has not been any harsh criticism (neither
members of congress nor senior security advisers) proposing any foreign policy changes nor
calling the Saudi King to step down, not to mention the issue of unity/disunity and
abandonment. Due to the limited size of anti-government protests in Saudi Arabia, the US
policymakers and Congress were not driven into significant actions and thus only a limited
amount of information has been collected for this research.
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For example, William M. Daley (President Obama’s chief of staff, 2011-2012)
asserted that from the US perspective, popular uprisings for democracy should not be allowed
in Saudi Arabia and further explained that ‘the possibility of anything (like in Egypt)
happening in Saudi Arabia was one that couldn’t become a reality. For the global economy
(a reference to Saudi oil), this couldn’t happen. Yes, it was treated differently from Egypt. It
was a different situation’ (Cooper & Worth, 2012: Wickham, 2013). As for congressional
opinions, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee 2012 report stated that stability in the
Persian Gulf is vital to America’s economic growth, making the Saudi monarchy invaluable
to the U.S. and the most significant congressional dissenting voices against the Saudi
monarchy was nothing more than the fourteen female senators’ criticism on ‘the ban on
women driving’, and urged the King to lift the ban in a petition letter (Wickham, 2013:
Epstein, 2011).
The strength of lobbying activities during the Arab Spring
As suggested by Jentleson (2010), lobbying activities could influence foreign
policymaking decisions to some degrees because of lobby groups’ influence upon
congressmen/senators/foreign policy-makers to preserve the interests of their
voters/constituencies. Therefore, it is fair to say that the relative influence/powers of different
lobby groups working for the governments of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Egypt, Yemen
respectively could be one of the explanations, albeit confined to a small role, of whether the
US government’s decisions to abandon the regime or continue to support the regime in the
wake of Arab Spring. If particular lobby groups are very powerful in defending the interests
of a particular regime, that regime is not likely to be abandoned because of the probably
strong opposition from congressmen/senators.
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In order to measure the relative strengths of the lobby groups of Saudi Arabia,
Bahrain, Yemen and Egypt, the following factors are examined: campaign finances (lobbying
costs and financial contributions to the election campaigns of senators/congressmen involved),
their organization structures, the ease of access to foreign policy-makers, ability to guarantee
of lawmakers’ jobs (whether the lobbyists could mobilize voters to vote for
congressmen/senators favourable to them or any forms of post-retirement employments)
(Gregg, 2002: Dekker, 2010: Smith, 2000: Dershowitz, 2010).
Among all Arab lobby groups, the Saudi lobby is by far the most powerful one and it
has achieved brilliant success throughout the years acting on behalf of the Al-Saud regime
(ArutzSheva 7, 2011). Therefore, when the Saudi protests happened, there would be a
remarkably strong commitment of the congressional and many other US domestic political
factors to preserve the regime, thanks to the Saudi-paid lobbyists and coupled with the US
domestic politics/international conditions favouring the Al-Saud dictator such as minimal size
of protests, loyal military and absence of viable power alternatives. Thus, the Obama
administration would be very reluctant to criticize or even abandon the Al-Saud monarchy.
Here are some of the remarkable influences of the Saudi lobby. Despite the Israel
lobby objections over the arms sales of AWACS planes to Saudi (the largest single arms sales
in US history), the Saudi lobby won and this arms sales gained congressional approval in the
end and Saudi pressures have also prevented the efficient investigation of the al-Qaidainvolved Khobar Towers bombing in 1996 and the USS Cole Bombing in 2000 (MacArthur,
2007).
In particular, because of Saudi’s large amount of oil money, the Saudi regime has
been paying over $100 million for the past 14 years to over 14 public relations firms,
lobbyists in America to lobby for the regime such as Qorvis Communications, LLC (over
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$60.3 million since the past decade), the Loeffler Group, LLP (over $10.5 million), BursonMarsteller (over $3,619,286.85), Loeffler Tuggey Pauerstein Rosenthal, LLP ($2,350,457.12),
Middle East Policy Council with $1 million from Prince Alwaleed bin Talal bin Abdulaziz alSaud in 2007 (Goldberg, 2010:Goldfarb, 2009).
Instead of the ‘bottom-up’ approach of ethnic lobby, Saudi lobby has a well-organized
of ‘non-partisan American experts’, consisting many retired officials from the State
Department, diplomats, current congressmen, senators, US Defense Contractors, academics
to form the ‘elite lobbying corps’ and thus formal officials could provide the Al-Saud regime
with guidance on the way ‘to manipulate American policymakers decisions’ and the contacts
accumulated when they served as government employees could also be used to enable
‘Saudi’s access to existing policymakers’ and the Saudi Prince Bandar is also a close friend
with former President George H.W. Bush and Bush junior , all these would effectively solve
the problems faced by Arab ethnic lobbies such as the prejudice against Arab Americans and
difficulty in the access to policymakers (Dershowitz, 2010: ArutzSheva 7, 2011:MacArthur,
2007: Dekker, 2010). The employment problems faced by congressmen and senators are also
solved since besides the campaign contributions and salaries provided by the Saudi lobby, the
Saudi lobby has also in turn provided post-retirement employments for congressmen and
senators depending on their ties with the regime(Dershowitz, 2010).

As for the Egypt lobby, although it is also a strong lobby, it is comparably weaker
than the Saudi lobby, so when the Egyptian Revolution broke out in 2011, the power of the
lobby might not be strong enough to safeguard the Mubarak interests in the US Congress, so
when faced with relatively low pressures from congress and other foreign policy advisers,
this would be another intervening variable to why Obama abandoned Mubarak in the end
when other international/US domestic political conditions had also turned unfavourable.
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In terms of campaign finance, although Mubarak spent an amount of 1.1 million
annually to lobbying activities to enhance the US-Mubarak relations with the help of
lobbying firms such as Podesta, Livingston, and Moffett , all of which were responsible for
facilitating the interactions between American policymakers and Egyptian officials, military
aids, the amount of spent by the Al-Saud regime is much more higher, amounting to 7.14
million annually (Good, 2011: Goldberg, 2010). In terms of access to decision-makers, the
Egypt lobby also played a good role here since through the use of American public relation
firms and members of congress, the problems of access to decision-makers and anti-Arab
prejudice faced by ordinary ethnic lobbies were solved and for example, there were ‘at least
279 contacts’ between the lobbying firms and congressmen, senators, officials, defense
contractors, and even some of the best lobbyists were hired in the wake of Egyptian uprisings
such as the Podesta Group, Bob Livingston (R-LA.) (Livingston Group), Toby Moffett (DCT.) (chairmen of the Moffett Group) (Rosiak et al, 2009: Good, 2011).

However, in terms of organization structure and employment issues of the members
of congress, the Egypt lobby performed not so good as what the Saudi lobby did. For
example, since the Egypt lobby did not employ former officials and former members of
legislations, the Egypt lobby, albeit with financial contributions to election campaign, did not
secure them with post-retirement employments, lowering their commitment towards the
Mubarak government or even leading to their withdrawal of supports during the crisis in
Egypt (Lichtblau, 2011).

For the Bahrain lobby, it is irrefutably even weaker than the Egypt lobby and Saudi
lobby in almost all aspects (campaign finance, organizational structure, access to
policymakers, votes/post-retirement employment). However, the Al-Khalifa monarchy
survives till now without the abandonment by Obama because of the help from the Saudi
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lobby along with many other favourable international/US domestic political conditions to the
Bahraini monarchy (Entous, 2011).
In terms of campaign finances, ever since the Shiite unrests in Bahrain 2011, AlKhalifa monarchy has spent ‘millions of pounds’ to improve the regime’s image particularly
in America (Tomlinson, 2012). However, compared with the hundreds of millions spent
throughout the years by the Egypt and Saudi lobby, the Bahraini regime has only started
significant efforts in lobbying in America ever since the uprisings in 2011 and the money
spent (although numbered in millions), is not comparable to the amounts by the Saudi and
Egypt lobby. For access to policymakers, Al-Khalifa has employed many public relations
firms such as the Potomac Square Group, Joe Trippi & Associates, Sanitas International,
Qorvis Communications (Bockenfeld, 2011). However, the lobby’s organization structure has
only been mature since the unrests in 2011, which is incomparable to the high-ranked
powerful Saudi and Egypt lobby groups and since there are no any former officials are
employed, the employment issue of lawmakers is unsolved (Bockenfeld, 2011).
The main point in Al-Khalifa’s survival thus lies in the overwhelming influence of the
Saudi lobby in Washington, despite the Bahrain lobby’s own relative weaknesses (Askari,
2011). Because of Al-Saud’s fears of further emboldening the Shiite protests in the Eastern
Province and the rise of Shiite Iran, the powerful Saudi lobby has tried hard to persuade
Washington not to pursue a ‘regime change’ in Bahrain and as suggested by Professor
Hossein Askari, the reason for Washington’s failure to back Shiite uprising against the AlKhalifa monarchy was ‘the power of Saudi lobby in Washington’ and he also remarked that
‘our(America’s) marriage to the Al-Saud threatens our(America’s) national security’
(Byman et al, 2011:Turse, 2011:Askari, 2011).
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For the Yemen lobby, the lobby was even weaker and failed to defend the Saleh’s
interests, leading to Obama’s eventual abandonment of Saleh when there was a powertransfer deal to Hadi (US Department of State, 2011).Similar to the Bahrain lobby, the Saleh
government had also employed several American public relations firms such as Qorvis
Communications (The Huffington Post, 2011b).However, the whole organizational structure
of Yemen lobby was poor with relatively fewer funding and indeed it is reported that there
was virtually no any lobby groups for the Saleh government between 2002 and 2010, except
when an American F-16 pilot proposed to lobby for Yemen in 2010, not to mention the
problems of lack of powerful figures in the lobby group, lack of post-retirement career
opportunities as well as the lobby’s poor ability to mobilize the public to vote for the relevant
senators/congressmen (Tiron, 2010).
Thus, even the Yemen lobby could reach policymakers because of the use of public
relations firm, it was largely ineffective and thus when the Yemeni revolution 2011 escalated
there were no any effective supports from powerful lobbying efforts. Thus, when the GCC
brokered a deal and other international/US domestic political conditions turned unfavourable
against Saleh, Obama abandoned Saleh (US Department of State, 2011).
American mass media and US public opinion during Arab Spring foreign policy crisis
As suggested by Naveh (2002):Smith & Hadfield & Dunne (2008), the US mass
media could affect foreign policymakers’ decisions (the CNN effect) and mass media
coverage could also be shaped by foreign policymakers to achieve their political goals if they
have a media management(MM) policy. In the case of Arab Spring, the US mass media was
likely to pose an effect on US foreign policymakers’ decision to drop Mubarak and Saleh
eventually while the US mass media failed to force Obama to abandon Al-Khalifa and AlSaud possibly because of the media management policies controlled by the Obama
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administration in the Bahrain and Saudi Arabia cases not to cover information unfavourable
to the US government (Francesca, 2013).
In the case of Egypt Revolution 2011, the CNN effect on the US policymakers to drop
Mubarak worked through agenda-setting, priming, and framing. For example, in light of the
close political ties between the US and the Mubarak government, the American mass media
such as (CNN) repeatedly had live reports of new events during the popular protests against
Mubarak, broadcasting thousands of ‘violent, emotional, negative’ images from time to time,
despite a government-caused internet shutdown, as manifested by the US media coverage of a
Egyptian protestor yelling ‘I will die today’ together with images of millions of protestors on
the Qasr el Nil Bridge and Tahrir Square as well as Mubarak police brutality against
protestors (McPhedran, 2011:Sheline, 2011: CNN Press Room, 2011:Naveh, 2002: ABC
News, 2011).
Furthermore, the American media also framed the issue in a liberal side telling
Mubarak to go. For example, a columnist of New York Times named Nicolas Kristof once
remarked that ‘it should be increasingly evident that Mr. Mubarak is not the remedy for
instability in Egypt; he is its cause. The road to stability in Egypt requires Mr. Mubarak's
departure, immediately’ and a CNN news reporter named Anderson Cooper also criticized
strongly the Mubarak government upon being hit twice by pro-Mubarak protestors (Jurkowitz,
2011: The Huffington Post, 2011c).
Thus, the effects of agenda-setting, priming are served because the media highlighted
the issue of Egyptian uprising against Mubarak in America and most importantly, the
American public is likely to judge the Obama’s policies towards Mubarak as a failure.
Furthermore, it is not surprising that the American public/policymakers were guided to think
in the way that Mubarak should step down as soon as possible because of the American
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media’s interpretative frame. Thus, all these would generate a huge media pressure forcing
the Obama administration to drop Mubarak. Furthermore, the American media has also
generated American public opinion in favour of the Egyptian protestors, as manifested by the
fact that the American favourable opinion of Egyptian government decreased from 58% in
2010 to only 40% in the wake of Egyptian revolution 2011, while 50% of Americans had
unfavourable opinions of the Mubarak government and 82% of respondents were even
‘sympathetic towards the Egyptian protestors’ (Drake, 2011&Jones, 2011).
As a consequence, the Obama administration was repeatedly confronted with many
violent, negative media images and videos showing the brutality of Mubarak government and
the plight of protestors together with the powerful dissenting U.S. public opinions. As a
liberal democracy accountable to the public, the US government had no choice but to
withdraw supports to Mubarak eventually when other international/US domestic political
conditions also turned unfavourable to Mubarak.
Similar to the Egyptian revolution, the CNN effect on the American foreign policy
decisions in the case of the Yemeni Revolution 2011 also manifested itself in agenda-setting,
priming and framing. In the case of agenda-setting and priming, the US mass media reported
‘violent, emotional, negative’ events of Yemeni revolution from time to time. For example,
the New York Times showed images of hundreds and thousandsof protestors demonstrating
against Saleh at Sanaa University (10,000) and 6000 elsewhere and CNN also reported
images more than 1000 women protestors attacked by gangs, the government’s murder of
protestors(Bakri & Goodman, 2011:Jamjoom& Almasmari , 2011:Naveh, 2002:Almasmari,
2011a).
Thus, these American media reports have put the issue of Yemeni revolution onto the
highlight and became a heated issue in among US citizens or even US foreign policy makers
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(agenda-setting) and the American public was likely to think that it would be a policy failure
if Obama’s continued to support Saleh. In addition, the extremely violent and negative
reports/images broadcasted by the US media have also guided the American
public/policymakers to side with the Yemeni protestors. For example, the Washington Post
and CNN reported repeated Saleh’s loyalists, gunmen’ attacks on anti-Saleh protestors,
especially in the capital of Sanaa,CNN’s editorial praising youth protestors and democracy
(Raghavan, 2011: Oweidat & Schneider, 2011: Almasmari, 2011b). Furthermore, some
dissenting American public opinions were also formed against Saleh. For example, an
American civil right advocacy NGO named ‘Center for Constitutional Rights said that it
would file a lawsuit in the American civil court against Saleh once he sought medical
treatment in the United States and urged the US government not to issue visa to him on the
grounds of his human right crimes (Yemen Fox, 2011c).
To sum up, the American public/foreign policymakers were likely to be guided by the
American media’s interpretative frames to think that Saleh should go for the sake of the
Yemeni democracy and stability. Most importantly, from time to time, the Obama
administration was confronted with repeated negative U.S. media reports/images which
would generate mounting media and public opinion pressure and as a liberal democracy
thanks to the effects of agenda-setting, priming and framing. Thus, Obama could not
effectively ignore these pressures when other international/US domestic political conditions
also turned unfavourable to Saleh and eventually U.S. dropped Saleh.
However, as for the Bahraini and Saudi spring, the CNN effect failed to exert its
effects on Obama foreign policy decision-making, possibly because of the media
management policies of the US governments for the sake of preserving national interests.
Thus, the mainstream American media tried to minimize coverage/downplay the seriousness
of the Bahraini/Saudi protests, making any agenda-setting, priming and framing impossible,
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not to mention generating public opinion in favour of the protestors (Cavell, 2012). Thus, the
Obama administration so far has neither been confronted with any significant pressure from
the media nor the American public opinion forcing him to drop Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa.
In the case of Bahraini protests, while there was 489-minute coverage of the Egyptian
Revolution by ABC, NBC and CBS news, there was only a total of 34-minute American
media coverage of the Bahraini protests in 2011(Lobe, 2012:Cavell, 2012). ABC News (The
Global Affairs Anchor), CNN (An anchor and the Chief International Correspondent) even
neglected the Bahraini protests in ‘the year-end summary of Arab Spring’, while focusing on
the Arab Spring uprisings in Egypt, Syria and Tunisia, Libya (Cavell, 2012:Amanpour,
2011).In 2011, CNN personnel was exposed to ‘extreme intimidation’ while trying to make a
documentary of Arab Spring in Bahrain and the documentary was also never broadcasted by
the CNN International (Krieger, 2012).
For the Saudi protests, the mainstream American media also seemed to downplay the
seriousness of the protests (Francesca, 2013). For example, while most of the US media such
as CNN covering the Saudi protests starting from 2011, female protestors fighting for
women’s right in Saudi Arabia was always the focus and even in the media coverage of the
Shiite protestors, police brutality and killing of protestors were downplayed and neglected,
with news reports entitled ‘161 arrested in Saudi Arabia protest over detentions’ and ‘Saudi
security breaks up protest, witnesses say’ (CNN, 2013: Jamjoom, 2013: CNN, 2011c). Indeed,
according to Adala Centre for Human Rights (2012): Francesca (2013), over 600 hundred
people were arrested by the Saudi authorities for protesting against the monarch and some
were even killed and wounded by the Saudi police in the Eastern city of Qatif and those
Shiite human right activists were even ‘harassed’ and banned to travel overseas after their
release from prison ,and the total number amounted to over 300 people such as Fadhil Al
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Manasif from Qatif and Mohammad AlBajadi from Riyadh, all of whom failed to get
significant news coverage in the American media.
The reason for such scenarios is possibly due to the mounting US government
pressures not to broadcast the Bahrain/Saudi Spring in a very negative way because of
important US national interests in Bahrain such as power balance against the Shiite Iran, and
the Fifth Fleet Naval Base, or even out of the reason to protect the Saudi interests so as to
protect America’s oil interests/counterterrorism in return and the Saudi and Bahrain lobby
also played a role here because they could also influence foreign policymakers decisions, as
mentioned above and thus the US media coverage of the Saudi and Bahraini protests also
failed to affect the US policymakers to change their positions (Krieger, 2012: Cavell, 2012:
Francesca, 2013).
Chapter IV: Conclusion, Limitations, Suggestions
To conclude, this research has provided reasons/rationales behind the seemingly
contradictory US foreign policies towards friendly Arab autocracies (Mubarak Egypt, Saleh
Yemen, Al-Saud Saudi Arabia, Al-Khalifa Bahrain) (realism in practice with some liberal
elements) by answering the research questions and hypothesis using qualitative analysis,
literature review with a set of theoretical models.
For example, the US grand strategy model, when applied in the context of the Arab
world, explains that there are both realist and liberal policies in US foreign policies towards
the friendly Arab regimes and the reasons why realist policies always predominate over
liberal policies in the US foreign policies towards friendly Arab regimes, possibly because of
the following reasons: the highly anarchic situations in MENA, the fast changing conditions
in MENA and most importantly, the overriding US national interests concerns (the revised
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national interest analysis; power, peace, oil and Israel) which can be delivered only by those
friendly Arab authoritarian regimes.
This research also seeks to understand why Obama abandoned Mubarak and Saleh in
the wake of the Arab Spring, while the Al-Saud and Al-Khalifa are still supported till now.
This research suggests that international conditions (regime capability to cope with the
protests, military loyalty, the existence of better alternatives) by Petras (2011), and US
domestic politics (congressional/senior advisory unity in opinion, the strength of lobbying
groups, US media and US public opinion) do play very important roles in explaining Obama
foreign policy changes.
For example, Obama gave up Mubarak and Saleh because the civilian protests have
gradually gone far beyond their control and their militaries deflected and sided with the
protestors and there were also better alternatives to them (Omar Suleiman and the Egyptian
military, the Vice Yemeni president Hadi), while the reverse applied to cases of the AlKhalifa and Al-Saud regimes. For the factors of US domestic politics in the case of Mubarak
and Saleh, there had been unified oppositions from the Congress and senior advisors and the
Egypt and Yemen lobbies were comparatively weaker than the Saudi-Bahrain lobbies, and
there had been widespread American media coverage of the atrocities committed by the
Mubarak and Saleh authorities committed against civilians, leading to American public
opinions to give up these regimes, while the reverses were true in the cases of the Al-Saud
and Al-Khalifa regimes.
This research is significant in a way that it makes great contributions to MENA (Arab
democratization) since US support is very important to the survival of these neopatrimonial
Arab regimes (Hinnebusch, 2006). Secondly, it also contributes to counterterrorism efforts
since the prolonged US supports to these regimes breed anti-Americanism/anti-Israel
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sentiments (Byman et al., 2011). Furthermore, although there are existing journal articles
accounting for why US supported fellow Arab autocracies, there is a shortage of research
articles using theoretical models such as US grand strategy model to understand the reasons
for the prolonged US aids to these regimes and there have not been many articles using a
combination of analyses of international conditions and US domestic politics to explain
Obama’s drops of Mubarak and Yemen, all of which would provide readers with a
comprehensive understanding of the dynamics in US foreign policy towards Arab
authoritarianism in the wake of the Arab Spring.
There are also several inherent limitations of this research paper due to some
insurmountable difficulties and some suggestions for future research are also listed below.
For example, the case studies in this research articles are only confined to the four
most representative and most important Arab regimes (Mubarak Egypt, Saleh Yemen, AlSaud Saudi Arabia, Al-Khalifa Bahrain) to US national interests in the Arab world due to
time and resources constraints. However, it is suggested that there were also other friendly
Arab regimes worth a mention which either experienced serious protests and some
government changes such as the al-Maliki Iraqi regime, which represented US interests in
counterterrorism and power balance between Sunni and Shiite. For the Ben Ali Tunisia
regime, although it was not discussed in this article due to relatively low value in
counterterrorism (Brownlee, 2012a), it is worth a mention due to the fact that it was the first
country to start the Jasmine Revolution. The Hashemite Jordanian regime has also been
suffering from civilian unrests and protests till now and the regime is important to preserve
America’s interests in protecting Israel, counterterrorism (Jordan Times, 2012: Department of
State, 2012).
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Furthermore, the whole research is based on secondary sources and literature review,
without any primary sources collecting in either in the US or those Middle Eastern Arab
countries due to time and capability constraints, lowering the level of originality to a certain
extent. For example, the American public opinion poll of whether the US should drop
Mubarak was cited from secondary resources such as a newspaper called Politics Daily and
the Gallup Politics opinion poll without any primary sources used. Furthermore, the relative
strengths of lobby groups are also based on literature review without any first-hand
interviews. Thus, for any future research in the US supports towards other friendly Arab
regimes such as Iraq, Jordan, it is thus suggested that on-site survey and interview be
conducted to find out the relative strengths of Egypt, Yemen, Saudi, and Bahrain lobby
groups in the wake of Arab Spring and the American public’s opinions on US supports to
these regimes.
Meanwhile, although the focus of this research is not on Arab democratization, it is
about how and why US supported these regimes. There are some relevancies to Arab
democratization and it is worth noting that Arab democratization does not solely depend on
US foreign policy supports.
Indeed, there are many other factors affecting democratic transition such as economic
crisis, regime type , level of neo-patrimonialism, the role of military, the possibility of having
a strong democratic opposition, history of political/economic liberalizations, diffusion
(contagion effects) of protests in other neighbouring countries (Andersen, 2011: El-Shimy,
2011,Timpane, 2011). As for democratic consolidation, it also hinges on factors of economic
development, so that countries with more capitalist development are likely to consolidate
their democratic systems in the long run (Miller & Martini, 2012:Teorell, 2010). Thus, it is
also suggested that any further related research on Arab democratization should take all these
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factors into account, so as to generate a full picture of what the obstacles to Arab
democratization are.
Most importantly, there is an urgent need to have some useful suggestions to the US
government future foreign policies towards friendly Arab authoritarian regimes since the
changes in US policies towards Arab autocracies were only confined to the abandonment of
Mubarak and Yemen. However, the overall principle to supports authoritarian regimes in
exchange for national interests has not changed yet, as stated by Brownlee (2012a).
It is suggested that the US government should fight for long-term interests of solid
stability, power in MENA rather than short-term interests of fragile stability. For example,
while the US government should maintain some supports to its friendly Arab regimes for the
time being, those supports should not be that extensive as before and instead the US
government should adopt real and meaningful pushes for reforms, transformations in a
gradual manner, in lieu of the hypocritical, rhetorical urges for democratization and reforms
in the past. For example, apart from exerting gradual pressure on the Arab regimes, the US
should also enhance her democracy promotion programs by increasing the amount of funding
and strengthening the existing commitment/initiatives to build better civil societies and rule
of law.
The reason is that, as manifested by the Arab Spring, a myriad of political, economic
problems have aroused from authoritarian regimes, which could breed people’s discontent,
ending up with a series of large-scale protests, civil disobediences and uprisings and thereby
lowering the legitimacy of pro-American Arab regimes and destabilizing the peace process
(Byman et al., 2011). In short, America’s image overseas is, once again, tarnished, being seen
as a victimizer, hypocrite more than a liberator and US’s efforts in making a stable Arab
World are doomed to backfire (Byman et al., 2011). According to Byman et al. (2011), an
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Arab opinion poll showed that Arab people disliked US interferences into the Arab world
(Byman et al., 2011).
To sum up, Byman et al. (2011) suggested that the US itself has further facilitated
uncontrollable Islamists’ hostile takeovers/terrorism/anti-Semitism and hostile Iranian
actions. Therefore, should America stop supporting autocrats as a means to do away with
radical Islamists or the Iranian theocratic regime at the expense of short-term interests like
temporary free flow of oil, temporary stable oil prices and temporary political stability? Or
should America stick to the current mode of doing things because of the high opportunity
costs of unforeseeable long-term benefits? The answer is simple and obvious if the American
foreign policymakers learn from the lesson of Arab Spring and Arab discontents as a result of
US foreign policies of supporting Arab authoritarian regimes.
While some may argue that the withdrawal of US supports to these regimes may
breed Islamist takeover with increasing anti-Semitism and Shiite Iranian rise in MENA, this
argument is not really convincing if the US government adopts the above suggestions of
gradual push for Arab democratization, liberalization and initiatives to build better civil
societies. Although there may be some short-term periodic instabilities such as occasional
Islamic terrorism, those problems are only occasional and short-term because of the
temporarily lack of civil societies. They would not exist in the long-term since Islamic
extremism and terrorism are in negative correlation with the strength of civil societies in Arab
countries.
If Arab civil societies could be built in a gradual manner with US long-term
democracy promotion program and genuine push for democratization, these civil societies
would be more mature since without US supports to autocracies, the rent-seeking behaviour
and levels of neo-patrimonialism/rent-seeking behaviour would be largely lowered in the
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cases of Arab regimes, especially those non-oil states such as Egypt and Yemen. With a civil
society and a relatively good civil society, it would foster the development of ‘a significant
degree of institutional differentiation between religion and state’, also known as ‘twin
toleration’ so that religious authorities and the government officials would not act against
each other and both could peacefully co-exist with a consensus so that the chance of Islamic
terrorism would be lower and the level of anti-Semitism would be also be lessened, albeit not
totally eliminated (Stepan& Linz, 2013).
For example, in Tunisia after the fall of Ben Ali, it is considered to be ‘a civil state
(dawlamadaniyah) rather than a religious state’ with relatively a strong civil society and there
had been no significant violent, anti-American Islamist takeover with strong rhetoric to
destroy Israel so far since both moderate Islamists led by the Ennadha movement and liberals
led by Moncef Marzouki cooperate and have formed a coalition government (Stepan& Linz,
2013). In addition, the Islamic doctrines themselves are not considered to necessarily violent
and anti-democracy since according to the Koran (2:256), ‘there should be no compulsion in
religion’ and a political scientist from Indonesia, which is a democracy, also remarked that
‘the Koran doesn’t say anything about the formation of an Islamic state or about the
necessity and obligations on the part of Muslims to establish a Sharia or Islamic State’
(Künkler & Stepan, 2007).
Similarly, for the case of Iran’s possible ascendency in MENA, since the Iranian
appeal of Islamic revolutions is based on frustration, if there are changes in American foreign
policy to improve the political rights and economic situation of Arab people, the rise of Shiite
Iran would encounter lots of difficulties and carry no legitimate grounds at all and thus the
threats of Iran extremism and anti-Israel sentiments would also be lowered (Chubin, 2012).
For the threats of oil supply, it is worth noting that the Al-Saud regime, apart from its vast oil
resources, also depends heavily on US supports for its effective control over the population
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and military capabilities. If the regime suddenly breaks friendly relations with the US, AlSaud may fail to compete with Shiite Iran in the region nor be able to withstand Islamic
terrorism. Furthermore, the regime may also suffer from great opportunity costs to establish
new relationships with other great powers like Russia, which is a close friend of the Iranian
regime by breaking the long-standing, solid friendships with the US.
Therefore, it is not worthwhile for US to stick to those dictators anymore since those
dictators themselves are also parts of the problems. They may provide US with short-term
interests, but in the long-term, they pose more harms than benefits to US national interests in
MENA.
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